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COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS: A PRELIMINARY
STEP TOWARD A GENERAL SYSTEMS
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
James L. Hildebrand*
No man is an Rand, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the
Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea,
Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a
Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any mans death
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde: And therefore
never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee. JOHN
DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, XVII (1623).
I. INTRODUCTION
International relations are becoming increasingly interdependent and
multivariate. The once popular national isolationist policies, ineffective
in their own day, are neither viable nor effectually possible today. Con-
flicts among or within even the smallest nation-states have economic,
social and political implications which affect all of the major nations
and at times threaten even the continuing existence of the human spec-
ies. National sovereignty, "the central concept of traditional interna-
tional law and the taken-for-granted assumption underlying both the
public law and the private law of every existing legal system,"' is quickly
becoming an outdated doctrine for this spaceship we call earth.' Even
the politically polarized ideological beliefs of the United States and the
Soviet Union are becoming less extreme. Indeed, it can be argued that
the current East-West dMtente era has created a "new" international law
made up of consensually based rules.'
*A.B., Hamilton College, 1966; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1969; S.J.D. Candidate,
Harvard Law School. Member of the Ohio Bar.
This article is a modification of a chapter to appear in J. HILDEBRAND, SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS
TOWARD AN INTERACTIONAL THEORY OF LAW. All rights of future publication of this article are
reserved by the author.
'Jones, Law and the Idea of Mankind, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 754 (1962); Jones, Law and the
Idea of Mankind, 2 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 5, 6 (1970).
2
"in the last few decades, mankind has been overcome by the most fateful change in its entire
history. Modern science and technology have created so close a network of communication, trans-
port, economic interdependence-and potential nuclear destruction-that planet earth, on its jour-
ney through infinity, has acquired the intimacy, the fellowship,and the vulnerability of a space-
ship." B. WARD, SPACESHIP EARTH at vii (1966).
'See discussion in text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
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Furthermore, man's global environment, and ultimately the very ex-
istence of his species, is being increasingly threatened by wars of mass
destruction, over population, ecological pollution and the depletion of
natural resources. These threats are interrelated and have a cumulative
or polycentric effect, in that a problem in one specific area renders it
more difficult to solve the problems in any other area. A problem can
be said to be "polycentric" when it involves a complex of decisions of
which the judgment of one is to a large extent determinative of the
judgment made upon each of the others.' As Professor Richard A. Falk
of Princeton University has stated: "All these problems are caused by
the discretion vested in national government, and in some instances in
individual choice. The basis of all [these] problems is the inadequacy of
the sovereign states to manage the affairs of mankind in the 20th cen-
tury."'
The pace of modern social change depends, of course, upon a complex
set of interrelated and interacting factors, including not only the tech-
nological advance of science, but also the evolution of the "human
matrix" of social structures, education and economic conditions. The
problems of modern social reconstruction are problems of transcendent
difficulty, as well as transcendent importance. The success of any policy
for societal change must be evaluated ultimately in terms of its multidi-
mensional effects. The central problem then is how to control and direct
future sequential effects of present policies or outdated policies still in
use. Dr. Roger Revelle, professor of population policy and director of
the Center for Population Studies at Harvard University, has stated:
"Advances in the still rudimentary science of human ecology depend in
part on mutual understanding and cooperation among social and natu-
ral scientists and humanists, and in part on the development of new
methods for studying interacting processes in complex systems."' Many
of the primary ecological issues today are essentially "legal" in nature,
and lawyers and legal scholars must begin to appreciate and to effec-
tuate the sociological obligations inherent in our legal system.
As the trends which create the danger of irreversible catastrophe for
mankind increase, the means and possibilities of creatively controlling
such destruction are correspondingly reduced. The future of our plane-
'See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 669 (tent. ed. 1958).
'N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1969, at 10, col. I. See generally R. FALK, THE ENDANGERED PLANET
(1971).
'Revelle, Human Ecology and Ethics Are Inseparable, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1970, at 75, cols.
3-6, 3-4.
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tary history depends upon the rapid development of a new non-utopian
system for world stability and international peace. It is the underlying
thesis of this article that any attempt to effectuate such a rational and
non-utopian species-saving international society must necessarily take
into account man's basic sociological attributes and behavioralistic pat-
terns. Furthermore, the basic social institutions which are found in
almost all stages of human societal development must be made to corre-
spond, even on a world community level, to man's basic social attrib-
utes: the family and the economic system to physical needs and impul-
ses; the organizational system of tribes, clans, states, or regional
"spheres of influence" to the need for inner coordination and outer
defense; and the system of organized knowledge or beliefs (the ideologi-
cal or religious systems) to final psychic goals which relate the individ-
ual to mankind in general as well as to his universe.'
At the risk of over simplification, the first section of this article will
briefly discuss man's intra-species aggression and territorial imperative
behavior patterns in an attempt to show the relevance of understanding
"behavioral man" to the future expectations of our relativistic goals for
world stability and international peace. Certain interrelationships be-
tween these behavioral attributes, the population explosion, and the
pollution of man's global environment will also be indicated. Obviously
not every political scientist or judicial behavioralist would agree with the
interpretation, the informative approach, or even the empirical data
presented herein. However, the need today is for a continuing synthesis
of information springing from an interdisciplinary analysis.' Excessive
Professor Talcott Parsons has proposed the following four structural-functional concepts for
analyzing social systems: pattern maintenance, adaptation, goal attainment, and integration. See,
e.g., T. PARSONS, SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 28-29 (1966).
Concerning Parsons' social theory, see K. DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 14-15 (1968); K. DEUTSCH, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 133-35 (1970); D. MARTINDALE,
THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 421-25, 484-90 (1960); W. MITCHELL, SO-
CIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS: THE THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS 166 (1967); J. STONE,
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 20-28, 609-16 (1966). For a functional analysis of law
using Parsons' approach, see Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative Mechanism, in LAW AND SOCIOL-
OGY 73 (W. Evan ed. 1962). It has been suggested that Bredemeier's analysis "can be reduced to
the propositions of the Intersessen school in continental Europe . Dror, Book Review, 77
HARV. L. REV. 398, 399 (1963).
'Erwin Schr6dinger succinctly stated the problem as follows:
We have inherited from our forefathers the keen longing for unified, all-embracing
knowledge. The very name given to the highest institutions of learning reminds us, that
from antiquity and throughout many centuries the universal aspect has been the only
one to be given full credit. But the spread, both in width and depth, of the multifarious
branches of knowledge during the last hundred odd years has confronted us with a queer
dilemma. We feel clearly that we are only now beginning to acquire reliable material
1973]
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compartmentalization of knowledge has occurred, even in the venerable
discipline of legal education and juristic scholarship. Indeed, our legal
education seems to produce lawyers who are almost uniformly rational-
istic, purposivistic, and imbued with a common set of "juristic" assump-
tions. Once departmental and professional biases are overcome new
insights may be gleaned even from the most diverse and seemingly
unrelated sources. To quote a recent integrative treatise on international
law and the social sciences:
Probes in depth into areas of human activity either already covered or
susceptible to coverage by international legal norms become more
significant to the degree that they incorporate psychological, sociologi-
cal, economic, and similar data. Even the more settled areas of interna-
tional law are subject to more rigorous explanation, possibly even in
formulations manifesting predictive power?
If we are to survive the long range effects of our own technology, we
shall have to change our ways of problem solving to be able to assess
and evaluate long term social and environmental implications on a con-
tinuum which runs from the personal level to that of the world com-
munity. We may even have to sacrifice some of our most cherished
goals, such as the false god of unending economic growth.
The remaining sections of this article will then outline one approach
to modern optimal decision theory analysis which may provide the nec-
essary insight and understanding for a mutual reevaluation of nationally
espoused ideological outlooks and which may establish the basis for a
mankind perspective for our pluralistic international society.
The tentative nature of what is being attempted in this article should
be stressed. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this article can be viewed
as a preliminary step toward a new sociology of international law.
Briefly stated, the purpose of this article is to suggest that a possible
effectuating or operational sociological solution to the existing dilem-
mas of international law might be that of a trans-cultural consensus
coupled with the policy evaluation strategy of disjointed incremental-
for welding together the sum total of all that is known into a whole; but, on the other
hand, it has become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more than a
small specialized portion of it.
I can see no other escape from this dilemma (lest our true aim be lost forever) than
that some of us should venture to embark on a synthesis of facts and theories, albeit
with second-hand and incomplete knowledge of some of them . . . . E. SCHRODINGER,
WHAT IS LIFE at vii (1947).
See also Schubert, Behavioral Jurisprudence, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 407 (1968).
'W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 250 (1970).
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ism. This evaluative approach may further provide the means for avert-
ing an annihilation of the human species resulting from misguided intra-
specific aggression and the territorial imperative behavior pattern, both
of which appear to be phylogenetically programmed into man's basi-
cally aggressive nature.
II. THREE POLYCENTRIC PROBLEMS: MAN'S INTRA-SPECIES
AGGRESSION, His TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
A VIABLE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Every man is a product of two complex heritages-genetic and socio-
cultural. In general, however, man functions under fewer phylogenetic
constraints than lower level adaptive systems. The behavior of other
animals is primarily determined by genetic coding whereas in the case
of man ontogenetic mapping is much more determinative."° Professor
Walter Buckley has discussed this point as follows:
[Jiust as biological evolution represents the phylogenetic mapping of
the variety and constraints in the physical and biological environment
into the physiological structure of species via genetic coding, and learn-
ing represents the ontogenetic mapping in somewhat greater detail of
this variety via neurological coding, so human cultural development
and group socialization represents the extrasomatic mapping in much
greater detail and potential fidelity of the physical, social and psychic
variety in the environment via symbolic coding. This latter, by virtue
of its extrasomatic component, is thus freed from many biological
constraints, and underlies the phenomenon emphasized in Mead-man
as an interpreting, defining, choosing, deciding being."
Due to the fact that man is so little constrained by his genetic heritage
and the fact that man's past experience influences his present behavior,
so much so that "the child is father of the man" and culture is the
mother, he can plan for his future not merely on the basis of what he is
but of what he can become. Indeed, it may soon be possible for man to
alter his neurological and genetic constraints. Unfortunately, man will
still lack the superhuman prescience necessary to determine what
changes are desirable outside the context of his immediate socio-cultural
matrix. This problem is made more acute by the fact that the prescience
required would be that which would anticipate the ethical demands of
"Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 361, 395 (1970).
"Buckley, Self-Regulation and Self-Direction in Psychological Systems, in MODERN SYSTEMS
RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 315, 316 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
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the new social culture produced by such genetic manipulation. This
moral dilemma is reflected in C. West Churchman's definition that X
ought to do A on ethical grounds as "A is what X would do if he knew
the consequences of his acts, and if he knew what future men will
want."'" Despite the pragmatic impossibility of actually applying such
a teleological equation, it is not unknown in our Western judicial
thought that a man or a nation can be held to some "higher law of
humanity" which is defined at a time subsequent to the actual "crimi-
nal" act. 13
Man's socio-cultural and genetic heritages are of course in many ways
complementary. As Professor Konrad Lorenz has stated:
[Mian's whole system of innate activities and reactions is phylogeneti-
cally so constructed, so 'calculated' by evolution as to need to be
complemented by cultural tradition. . . . The equipment of man with
phylogenetically programmed norms of behavior is just as dependent
on cultural tradition and rational responsibility as, conversely, the
function of both the latter is dependent on instinctual motivation. 4
12C. CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES OF A SCIENCE
OF VALUES 22 (1961).
"
3The Nuremberg Trial of Nazi leaders after World War II revived an ancient tenet of Western
thought, namely, that a "'higher law" sometimes requires men to give their primary allegiance to
humanity rather than to the state. The Nuremberg Trials imposed liability for two "new" offenses
under international law: "crimes against peace," such as waging aggressive war, and "crimes
against humanity," such as mass murder and similar malevolent policies. Concerning the ex post
facto nature of these proscriptions, it is interesting to note that:
The fact that a defendant had acted under an order of his government or of a superior
was not to free him from responsibility for having carried it out, although superior orders
could be considered in mitigation of punishment if the tribunal decided that such would
be in the interest of justice. In this provision the charter of the tribunal took care of
what was certain to be a chief defense of many of the accused. A clause expressly
prohibiting the carrying out of inhuman or illegal orders had prudently been inserted in
the military manuals of the British and American armies only a year before. Up to that
time the accepted doctrine of both armies had been that a soldier must obey the orders
of his superiors whether he liked them or not. With the trials coming up, the regulations
were changed to provide that no order that offended a soldier's conscience need be
carried out. (Curiously, the German Army had a similarly phrased order. The German
soldier in World War I and even under the Nazis was told in his book of military law
that he was not to carry out orders he knew to be illegal.)
E. DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 20 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
Article 90 of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970),
provides that any member of the armed forces who "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his
superior commissioned officer" is subject to the death penalty in time of war and "by such
punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct" in time of peace. "A person cannot
be convicted under this article if the order was illegal; but an order requiring the performance of a
military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate."
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 169b, at 321 (1969).
"K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 265 (M. Wilson transl. 1963).
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However, genetic manipulation and neurological controls will not
provide an easy means for programming man's basic aggressive nature
in an effort to circumvent the probable self-annihilation of his species.
"That man is an aggressive creature will hardly be disputed. With the
exception of certain rodents, no other vertebrate habitually destroys
members of his own species."' 5 However, aggression may be the per-
verted face of ambition or a motivational driving power in human be-
havior-an individually constructive attribute. If aggression were bio-
logically removed from man, the human species might become like
Tennyson's soporific lotus eaters. To quote Lorenz again:
We do not know how many important behavior patterns of man in-
clude aggression as a motivating factor .... What is certain is that,
with the elimination of aggression, the "aggredi" in the original and
widest sense, the tackling of a task or problem, self-respect without
which everything that a man does .. would lose all impetus; every-
thing associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other
equally indispensable behavior patterns would probably also disappear
from human life. 6
Even when we are able to control neurologically man's basically aggres-
sive nature the peripheral effects most likely would be so individually
destructive that such action could not be justified. 7
Admitting the obvious lack of a general world sophistication, or a
"transnational consciousness," which might place intelligent men (or at
least their ruling elites) on a political level of effectuating a valid all
encompassing peace it might be cogently argued that "war" is an innate
and pervasive characteristic of man. In 1961 a Norwegian statistician
set a computer to work counting history's wars. The machine announced
that in the 5,560 years of recording human history there have been
14,531 wars, or 2.6135 a year. Of the 185 generations of man's recorded
"
5A. STORR, HUMAN AGGRESSION I (1960). See also E. DURBIN & J. BOWLBY, PERSONAL
AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR 3-31 (1939); S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 55-80 (J.
Strachey transl. & ed. 1962); H. KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 3-43 (1960); J. SCOTT, AG-
GRESSION 5-67 (1958); WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 3-43 (J. Clarkson & T. Cochran eds. 1941);
citations in note 31 infra.
"K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 278. See also Sears, Maccoby & Levin, The Socialization of
Aggression, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 350 (E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartly
eds. 1958); Hart, Sublimation and Aggression. 22 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 389 (1948). For a
discussion on the development of anti-aggression pills, see B. BARBER, DRUGS AND SOCIETY 161-
64 (1967); N.Y. Times, May 10, 1967, at 27, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1968, § I, at 1,
col. 3; Man Into Superman. TIME, Apr. 19, 1971, at 33-38 (Special Section).
"
7See, e.g., Kety, The Central Physiological and Pharmacological Effects of the Biogenic A mines
and Their Correlations with Behavior, in THE NEUROSCIENCES 444, 447 (G. Quarton, T. Melne-
chuk & F. Schmitt eds. 1967).
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experience, only 10 have known un unsullied peace."8 In his article enti-
tled "War is not the Normal Condition of Man," Professor Arnold
Toynbee sophistically concluded that while pugnacity and aggressive-
ness may well be innate elements in human nature: "War can be waged
only by states, and it takes at least two states to wage it. In a world in
which there is just one state-a world state embracing the whole of
society-international war is an impossibility. There can still be civil
wars, revolutions, insurrections, riots, disorders, because social justice
is never likely to be perfect, and because man is a pugnacious animal. '"'9
Professor Harry W. Jones of Columbia University has noted that: "It
is a tragedy of our time that nationalism has become a compelling
slogan again, that the charismatic leaders of the emergent countries of
Africa and Asia are nationalists and rarely libertarians. In the perspec-
tive of mankind, nationalism, regionalism, and emotional patriotism are
forces working against the possibility of an international rule of Law." 2
Similarly two other commentators have noted that: "The prevailing
pattern of twentieth-century nationalism is its power orientation. In
effect, there seems to be a fairly direct ratio between the totalitarian
characteristics of the government and the relative virulence of its peo-
ple's nationalism."'"
Nationalism and regional collective security, the two current aspects
of international relations which may provide the greatest obstacles to
effective world peace, can be viewed phylogenetically as overt manifes-
tations of man's intra-species aggression and territorial imperative so-
cial patterns. In order to more fully comprehend and attempt to con-
structively change the prevailing societal behavior as evidenced by these
phylogenetic traits, it may be instructively useful to make certain tenta-
tive comparisons between man's overt anti-social behavior and certain
basic animalistic instincts.2 We must be careful, however, in contrasting
18Time Essay, On War as a Permanent Condition, TIME, Sept. 24, 1965, at 30.
"N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 122, 126, col. 5.
"Jones, supra note 1, at 756: see generally K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICA-
TION 1- 14, 181-93 (2d ed. 1966); K. Deutsch, The Impact of Communications upon International
Relations Theory, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 74-92 (A. Said ed. 1968).
2 A. GYORGY & G. BLACKWOOD, IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 174 (1967). See also K.
DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1969); K. Gough, The Crisis of the Nation-State,
in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 41-69 (R. Fisher ed. 1964); E. HAAS,
BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 464-75 (1964); E. REVES, THE ANATOMY OF PEACE 175-88, 253-75
(2d ed. 1945).
22See H. Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations, in
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR 565-605 (H. Kelman ed. 1965); K. LORENZ, MAN MEETS DOG (1955).
See also G. Gurvitch, A Sociological Analysis of lnternational Tensions, in TENSIONS THAT CAUSE
[Vol. 3: 271
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man with other animals, to realize that the respective mechanisms and
inherent attributes are quite d ifferent. To suggest that they are the same
is to commit the zoomorphic3 or rattomorphic24 fallacy, the converse
of the anthropomorphic fallacy whereby human attributes are ascribed
to lower forms of life.
Konrad Lorenz has noted that animals, man included, tend to be far
more aggressive toward their own species than toward any other. Equat-
ing this aggressive behavior with Darwin's "struggle for existence,"
Lorenz defines this intra-specific aggression as "the fighting instinct in
beast and man which is directed against members of the same species." 5
Normally, intra-species aggression fulfills an important species-
preserving function:
The danger of too dense a population of an animal species settling in
one part of the available biotope and exhausting all its sources of
nutrition and so starving can be obviated by a mutual repulsion acting
on the animals of the same species, effecting their regular spacing out,
in much the same manner as electrical charges are regularly distributed
over all the surface of a spherical conductor. This, in plain terms, is
the most important survival value of intra-specific aggression.26
Perhaps, this species saving function accounts for intra-specific aggres-
sion having been phylogenetically programmed into man's social behav-
ior." However, it is apparent that with man this aggressive force could
lead to total annihilation of the human species.
Due to rapid and widespread technological advancement, man may
now have become the only animal in recorded history to have overrun,
lost, or never evolved an instinctive inhibition to terminate aggressive
WARS 243-53 (H. Cantril ed. 1950), reprinted in I J. ZAWODNY, MAN AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: CONFLICT 513-18 (1966). See generally W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, supra note 9, at
3-48; HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES (J. Springer ed. 1965).
"'See L. VON BERTALANFFY, ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS 15 (1966).
2 See A. KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 556-60 (1964).
11K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at ix, 18, 23-24.
"Id. at 31. With the exponential population explosion, such inter-human spacing will become
increasingly more difficult and may lead to the venting of new intra-specific aggression unless, of
course, the food supply diminishes to the point that the people are virtually too weak to kill one
another. See Lelyveld, Can India Survive Calcutta?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine),
at 38.
1K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 252-53. See also R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 288-
305 (1966); Ryterband, Letters: The Naked Ape, 2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1968, at 10. For a
collection of essays challenging Lorenz-Ardrey pessimism, see MAN AND AGGRESSION (M. Mon-
tagu ed. 1968).
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action or the accumulation of potential "overkill" mechanisms. Lorenz
explains this phenomenon as follows:
In human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden
manslaughter were necessary, because quick killing was impossible
anyhow; the potential victim had plenty of opportunity to elicit the pity
of the aggressor by submissive gestures and appeasing attitudes. No
selection pressure arose in the prehistory of mankind to breed inhibi-
tory mechanisms preventing the killing of conspecifics until, all of a
sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium of
killing potential and social inhibitions. When it did, man's position was
very nearly that of a dove which, by some unnatural trick of nature,
had suddenly acquired the beak of a raven [or the talons of a hawk].2"
All other animals have such an inhibitive instinct commensurate with
their killing power. The operational nature of modern weaponry places
the button-pusher far from the gore of his "kill" and further enhances
the danger of inherent inhibitions being ineffective in controlling man's
intra-species aggression:
If moral responsibility and unwillingness to kill have indubitably in-
creased, the ease and emotional impunity of killing have increased at
the same rate. The distance at which all shooting weapons take effect
screens the killer against the stimulus situation which would otherwise
activate his killing inhibitions. The deep, emotional layers of our per-
sonality simply do not register the fact that the crooking of the forefin-
ger to release a shot tears the entrails of another man ....
The same principle applies, to an even greater degree, to the use of
modern remote-control weapons. The man who presses the releasing
button is so completely screened against seeing, hearing, or otherwise
emotionally realizing the consequences of his action, that he can com-
mit it with impunity-even if he is burdened with the power of imagi-
nation .29
Of course, the obverse of this phenomenon is also observable in the
occasional unwillingness of otherwise "trained" troops to fire at an
enemy close enough to be recognizable as an individual rather than
simply as a target.
Professor Ivo Feierabend, who analyzed internal political violence in
84 nations over an 18-year period, testified before the National Com-
mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence on the apparent
"
8K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 241.
"Id. at 242.
[Vol. 3: 271
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"relationship between aggressiveness on the one hand, and rapid socio-
economic development and unsatisfied wants on the other."30
In the modern "civilized" community there are few legitimized out-
lets for venting the more crude forms of aggressive social behavior.3'
"To keep the peace is the first of all civic duties, and the hostile neigh-
boring tribe, once the target at which to discharge phylogenetically
programmed aggression, has now withdrawn to an ideal distance, hid-
den behind a curtain, if possible of iron."32 Thus, man has been forced
to acquire redirected activities of intra-species aggression. The most
sociologically disruptive manifestation of such redirections can be
termed "militant enthusiasm" -a specialized form of communal ag-
gression whereby instinctive appreciation for life and the instinctive
inhibitions against hurting or killing a member of one's species become
superseded by the "higher" duty to destroy those persons outside the
immediate socio-political system who are designated categorically as
"enemies. ' 33 It is in this collective aggression of one race, tribe, com-
munity, or nation, against another that we find the greatest danger to
the survival of the human species.34
3N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1968, at 38, cols. 1-4.31See Parsons, Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of
the Western World, 10 PSYCHIATRY 167-81 (1947), reprinted in I J. ZAWODNY, supra note 22, at
379-91; J. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 89-105. See also Galtung, A Structural Theory of Aggression,
I J. PEACE RESEARCH, No. 2, at 95-119 (1964), reprinted in I J. ZAWODNY, supra note 22, at 545-
66; Klineberg, Influences Making for Aggression, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL BULLETIN
No. 62: TENSIONS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 187-212 (1960), reprinted in I J.
ZAWODNY, supra note 22, at 567-75.
'
2K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 253.
1 War, through the medium of military institutions, has uniquely served societies,
throughout the course of known history, as an indispensable controller of dangerous
social dissidence and destructive antisocial tendencies. As the most formidable of threats
to life itself, and as the only one susceptible to mitigation by social organization alone,
it has played another equally fundamental role: the war system has provided the machi-
nery through which the motivational forces governing human behavior have been trans-
lated into binding social allegiance. It has thus ensured the degree of social cohesion
necessary to the viability of nations. No other institution, or groups of institutions, in
modern societies, has successfully served these functions. REPORT FROM IRON MOUN-
TAIN 81 (1967).
Similarly: "Another lesson from history is that much of ideological unity within democracies is
national rather than religious homogeneity. Patriotism has bridged many gulfs and still does so.
With this bond has often gone a unifying hatred of a common enemy. ... H. MAYO, INTRODUC-
TION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 304-05 (1960).
""Militant enthusiasm is particularly suited for the paradigmatic illustration of the manner in
which a phylogenetically evolved pattern of behavior interacts with culturally ritualized social
norms and rites, and in which, though absolutely indispensable to the function of the compound
system, it is prone to miscarry most tragically if not strictly controlled by rational responsibility
based on causal insight." K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 268.
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Interrelated with man's collective aggression is his territorial impera-
tive, a behavior pattern which evolved as a kind of defense mechanism
and which emphasizes the necessity of protecting a specifically bounded
area from external hazard. So central has been the concern for the two
dimensional division and control of space in international legal norms,
together with the corollary jurisdictional issues, that traditional interna-
tional law has been aptly defined as the science of territorial
jurisdiction."
According to Robert Ardrey, man's territorial imperative is cultur-
ally determined and is the foundation for human morality:
[Tihe territorial imperative. . . is the biological law on which we have
founded our edifices of human morality. Our capacities for sacrifice,
for altruism, for sympathy, for trust, for responsibilities to other than
self-interest, for honesty, for charity, for friendship and love, for social
amity and mutual interdependence have evolved just as surely as the
flatness of our feet, the muscularity of our buttocks, and the enlarge-
ment of our brains, out of the encounter on ancient African savannahs
between the primate potential and the hominid circumstance. Whether
morality without territory is possible in man must remain as our final
unanswerable question."
Ardrey sees an inverse relationship between the fall of hazard and the
rise of enmity:
Perhaps it has merely been that with growing control over our physical
environment we have been left with more free time for killing each
other. Without doubt our superb technological achievements have pre-
sented us with superb opportunities for wholesale murder denied the
ancient world. But even making proper allowance for the manifold
inducements, temptations, and opportunities more grandly expanding
our natural satisfactions derived from mutual massacre, I cannot elim-
inate from my estimates the necessity for enemies which falling hazard
compels.
And so we must face the unanswerable question: What will happen
if the control which we exert over our physical environment ever totally
35
T. WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44, 91 (1893). An interesting comparison
can be made to George Gurvitch's differential sociology of law as it relates to "territorial group-
ings." G. GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947).
36R. ARDREY, supra note 27, at 351. Compare text accompanying notes 42-43 infra. See also
Errington, The Phenomenon of Predation. 51 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 180 (1963); D. Whittlessey,
The Role of Geography in Twentieth-Century War, in WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION, supra note
15, at 78-87. On boundaries and linkage systems between national systems and the external envi-
ronment, see Deutsch, External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States, in APPROACHES TO
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8-10 (R. Farrell ed. 1966).
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eliminates natural hazard? Will man become the temperamental op-
posite of the emperor penguin? When hazard approaches zero, will
enmity approach infinity. 7
It would seem that the elimination of natural hazard compels the
necessity for common unifying enemies, but this gives rise to a further
predicament:
The human predicament contains two forces: On the one hand that
balance of terror, the pax atomica, compels a general peace, or at the
least insists that a general peace be observed until accident or cynicism
end it. In any event, war as we have known it has become both an
impractical outlet for our innate psychological needs and an impracti-
cal external pressure enforcing our [inter-communal] social amity. But
on the other hand man's cultural achievements have long since pressed
him beyond a point of possible return, and if he is to survive on his
irreversible course of technological mastery, specialized skill, and con-
sequent interdependence, then he becomes with every passing year,
every passing day, more at the mercy of social amity and mutual co-
operation.38
Assuming there is some functional validity in the concept of man's
intra-specific aggression and territorial imperative, as manifested in the
current international behavior that is characterized as "nationalism"
and "regional collective security," then as international political, legal,
economic and social relations become more totally integrated and man's
external morphogenetic39 processes become inter-circuited through the
mass communications media, several alternatives for international and
world power domination will arise.
First, the most powerful nation-states might effectively divide the rest
of the world and its resources between themselves. It is submitted that
such a polarized state of international existence, coupled with the exploi-
tation of less powerful countries, is not too distant from the present state
of world affairs.
Second, smaller nations might continue to combine into regional de-
fense organizations, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact group, and the
"
7R. ARDREY, supra note 27, at 349. See generally C. FORDE, HABITAT, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY:
A GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOLOGY (5th ed. 1963); Guliver, Land Shortage, Social
Change, and Social Conflict in East Africa, 5 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 16 (1961).
'R. ARDREY, supra note 27, at 349-50. See also Berkner, Can Technology Be Used to Achieve
Social Justice?-The Challenge to the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 98 (1967); Wald, The
Evolution of Life and the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 17 (1967).
a"Morphogenesis" refers to that level of systems complexity which is exemplified by deviation-
amplifying mutual causal relationships. See discussion in note 116 and accompanying text infra.
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Organization of American States, thus pooling their respective powers
and resources. In effect this alternative is not unlike the first, for if the
multitude of sovereign states eventually merged their defense systems
into only two or three collective defense mechanisms, "corresponding
to the super-states of Orwell's 1984, national sovereignties would be
correspondingly reduced in number, but the change would be from the
power balances of numerous big and small national states to the more
massive and potentially more destructive balance of power between two
or three blocks of super-Powers. 40
A third alternative, which would also theoretically meet man's behav-
ioral patterns of collective aggression and territorial imperative, would
be to "territorialize" the entire world against some externalized enemy
such as fictitious or real invaders from outer space.
A fourth alternative, similar to the third, would be for the entire world
to join in a perpetual "war" against the common unifying "enemy" of
an insufficient amount of oxygen, water and food for the exploding
world population. From a Malthusian point of view, the sheer lack of
space may force the total infusion of the seething world masses, making
it virtually impossible to define territorial boundaries. As Professor
Thomas Cowan has stated:
Exponentially viewed, it will not be long before the earth's surface
is packed solid with humans, the whole mass standing in individual
refrigerated capsules on a thick layer of immovable automobiles.
Babies will issue from this mass in a constant stream to stand on the
shoulders of their parents. Suddenly, atomic fusion is achieved by the
central computer which runs this horror and the mass dissolves into a
small exploding universe of positive and negative electrons, neutrinos,
and antineutrinos, baryons and leptons, all moving apart at relativistic
speeds. Before this, of course, we shall have all killed one another off
by the exponential rise in the crime rate, by radiation disease, and,
lacking all exercise, by dying shortly after birth from the ultimate
pollution, namely, the inability to move away from our own excre-
ment."
In a well known study by Faris and Dunham," it was discovered that
the rate of insanity, murder and acts of violence is directly proportional
40W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (1964).
4 Cowan, Law and Technology: Uneasy Leaders of Modern Life, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 120,
122 (1967).
42R. FARIS & H. DUNHAM, MENTAL DISORDERS IN URBAN AREAS (1939). See R. FARIS, SOCIAL
DISORGANIZATION 194-247 (1955). But cf. Alix, Functional Interdependence of Crime and Com-
munity Social Structure, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. (1969).
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to population density. The murder rate, for example, of any given area
may be predicted quite accurately by knowing no more than its density
of population. Other social scientists have found that people living under
high population density conditions develop oversized adrenal glands,
nervous tension, paranoia, and behavior disintegration at an alarming
rate. 3
In large part, our exponential population explosion is the underlying
cause for all of our problems concerning natural resources; there are
simply too many people fighting over a limited supply of renewable and
nonrenewable resources. The population problem is by no means limited
to the "have-not" and underdeveloped nations. In November of 1967
the population of the United States was 200 million, by November of
1969 it had exceeded 203 million and the average annual population
growth rate was 1.3 percent (compared with 2.1 percent growth rate of
underdeveloped nations and a world average population growth rate of
1.8 percent).44 Present projections put the United States population at
308 million by the year 2000, and 374 million by the year 2015. The
world population, which now stands at 3.5 billion, will be increased by
at least another 3 billion in the next 30 years; and by 2050 the world
population will exceed 15 billion unless extreme measures are taken.
These are exceedingly large numbers, large enough, in fact, to make
some biologists nervous about the future thermodynamic capacity of the
planet to continue operating indefinitely as a going concern.
One effective way of controlling environmental pollution is to limit
the number of pollutors, beginning with the biggest pollutors-the peo-
ple themselves. Generally speaking, there are two approaches to con-
trolling the population: first, by limiting the number of births, and
second, by increasing the number of deaths through a comprehensive
program of applied eugenics.45 For moral and philosophical reasons,
applied eugenics is not a viable solution; birth control is the only alterna-
tive.
"See, e.g., E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966).
"See TIME, Nov. 24, 1967, at 70; Kraus, The 1960's Should Have Been No Surprise for the
Demographers. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1970, § 12, at 16, cols. 2-8; id., Nov. 24, 1968, § 4, at 5 (full-
page ad sponsored by the Campaign to Check the Population Explosion). See generally GROWTH
OF THE WORLD'S URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, 1920-2000 (United Nations Publications
1970).
"See Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443 (1968); Grad,
Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 480
(1968); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons: The Population Problem has no Technical Solution.
It Requires a Fundamental Extention in Morality, 162 SCIENCE 1243 ( 1968); Wald, supra note
38.
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The United States, as a nation, is becoming aware that a voluntary
birth control program, as enunciated by President Nixon in July 1969,
is an unrealistic and futile approach to the problem. Direct controls,
such as compulsory sterilization or abortion, would be too offensive.
However, indirect economic incentives should be used to encourage the
postponement of marriage and the limitation of births within marriage.
The federal government should stop taxing single persons more heavily
than married ones, eliminate tax exemptions for children, expand the
concept of legal abortions and sterilization, and levy a "child tax" on
parents having more than one or two children." These suggestions are
extreme, and yet the choice today is not between the ideal and the
undesirable, but rather between the undesirable and the disastrous. If
nothing is done, in the next 10 or 20 years, 50 to 100 million people may
starve yearly. 7
In addition, man's ability to adapt to the deterioration of the quality
of his environment has ominous implications. It is probable that contin-
ued exposure to even low levels of toxic agents and pervasive noise will
eventually result in a great variety of delayed or latent pathological
manifestations, creating physiological and psychological misery: "[T]he
worst pathological effects of environmental pollutants will not be de-
tected at the time of exposure; indeed they may not become evident until
several years later. In other words, society will become adjusted to levels
of pollution sufficiently low not to have an immediate nuisance value,
but this apparent adaptation will eventually cause much pathological
damage in the adult population and create large medical and social
burdens." '48
Behaviorally, a similar slow mental disintegration may result from
noise induced cognitive dissonance, thus giving impetus to what has
been characterized as the developing mass societal neuroses. Insanity
and irrationality scales are based on current relative deviations from
4 N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1969, at 51, col. 1; See also id., Sept. 22, 1969, at 31, cots. 4-8.
'Professor Paul Ehrlich, among others, has emphasized that the "time of famines" is upon us
and may be at its worst and most disastrous by the end of this decade. See. e.g.. P. EHRLICH & A.
EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES IN HUMAN ECOLOGY (1970); P.
EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968); G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME-BOMB (1968). But
C. J. MADDOX, THE DOMESDAY SYNDROME (1971). See also S. CHANDRASEKHAR, HUNGRY PEO-
PLE AND EMPTY LANDS: AN ESSAY ON POPULATION PROBLEMS AND INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
(1955).
4Dubos, Adapting to Pollution, SCIENTIST AND CITIZEN, Jan. - Feb. 1968, at 1, 3 (emphasis
partially removed). See Ruff, Adaptation under Extreme Environmental Conditions; 389 ANNALS
19(1970).
"See Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future
Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 652 (1970).
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what is considered "normal" behavior. The frightening aspect of slow
societal trends towards what at an earlier time would have been consid-
ered irrational is that typically neurotic behavior of an earlier time may
slowly become the normal, and therefore acceptable, level of behavior
of a current or future stage of civilization or de-civilization. What is
degeneratus at Time One may be acceptable as sapiens at Time Two.
As essential elements for survival become more scarce, it may be
realistically questioned whether "democracy" in the neoclassical Ameri-
can sense, as a political form and a means for effectuating domestic and
foreign policy, can remain a functionally operative system for allocating
the earth's limited life sustaining resources.'" Inherent in the egalitarian
tenet of majority democracy, with its concept of total consensus, is the
basic disadvantage which is also found in species herding:
We know that the drive forcing the animals together is a tremendously
strong one, and that the attraction exercised by the herd over the
individual or over smaller groups of individuals increases with the size
of the herd, probably in geometrical proportion. Thus in many ani-
mals, for example bramblings, a deadly vicious circle may arise under
the influence of fortuitous external conditions, such as a particularly
good beechnut harvest in a certain area, the flocking together of these
birds may far exceed its usual extent, the avalanchelike swelling of
numbers may exceed the ecologically supportable limit, and the birds
may starve in masses.5 1
"'See text accompanying notes 53-54 infra. Note also the following statement concerning Marx
versus Malthus and the global threat of hunger:
In its preoccupation with the doctrine of Karl Marx, the United States has until
recently all but overlooked the more relevant Malthusian specter. In the face of mount-
ing hunger, the United States has permitted the war against communism to bring it into
alliance with feudal, land-owning oligarchies, where it should have been insisting upon
land reform as a condition for American aid. If the war against hunger is lost, it will
not be for lack of knowledge as to how it could be won; it will be because of lack of
cooperative effort on the part of the developed nations which, in turn, has been largely
though not wholly due to American preoccupation with a crusade waged with the wrong
means and in the wrong places. J. WARBURG, THE UNITED STATES IN THE POSTWAR
WORLD 209 (1966).
1K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 141. Compare with the following statement:
As to consensus, the extreme of "too little" consensus raises the danger of the destruc-
tion of democracy from within by social, economic, cultural, and other conflicts. The
other extreme of a "complete" consensus is a social conformity that makes liberties
meaningless. Democracy hovers forever between these two poles. In most of the existing
democracies the danger is perhaps greatest, in a time of international crisis like this,
from too much stress on consensus and unity. One thinks, for instance, of the damaging
effects of self-conscious "Americanism" upon liberties during the last decade. At any
rate, we do well to fear that we may be reading our own future in the features of
totalitarian states, whenever, like them, we stress unity at the expense of freedom. So it
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The purely quantitative, and in a sense democratic, action of the
herding process, called "social induction" by some sociologists, means
that a mass group becomes less resolute as its size increases and, correl-
atively, its herd instinct becomes stronger. Because this same behavior
is readily observable in human groupings," one might assume a nihilistic
outlook on the future of mankind as the world population continues its
exponential explosion. However, it should be noted that the intraspecies
aggression and the herd attraction can work as counteracting forces so
that a dynamic societal equilibrium is maintained. The important effect
of intraspecies aggression, namely the dispersing and spacing out of the
individual units of a species, is essentially opposed to that of herd attrac-
tion. "Strong aggression and very close herding exclude one another,
but less extreme expressions of the two behavior mechanisms are not
imcompatible. 5 3
In sum, "pure" democracy on a world level, without some authoritar-
ian variable such as the trans-cultural consensus would run the risk of
subjecting the entire human species eventually to a slow "rationed"
death as the diminishing life sustaining resources were divided equally
among all persons. Yet, it is difficult for many individuals to compre-
hend, for example, the sequential logic which links the conscious, demo-
cratic and political decision to restrict grain production in the United
States in the face of an eventual famine in Asia.
Concerning our ecological crisis, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith
has stated that: "Pollution may well be the nation's most broadly based
and democratic effort." 54 On a more existential and international level,
is not out of place to deplore the frenzied search for a unifying creed in the democracies.
H. MAYO, supra note 33, at 308-09.
See also citations in notes 91-92 infra.
sSee generally E. WALKER & R. HEYNS, AN ANATOMY FOR CONFORMITY (1962); Turner,
Collective Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 382 (R. Faris ed. 1964).
11K. LORENZ, supra note 14, at 146. Note also that behavioralistically there may be a basic
necessity for stratification in any social system. If this is true, then perhaps the democratic egali-
tarian theory should be modified to reflect structural-functional reality. Compare Davis & Moore,
Some Principles of Stratification, 10 AM. Soc. REV. 242 (1945), with Tumin, Some Principles of
Stratification 18 AM. Soc. REV. 387 (1953). But see Davis, Reply, 18 AM. Soc. REV. 394 (1953);
Moore, Comment, 18 AM. Soc. REv. 397 (1953). See generally B. BARBER, STRATIFICATION
(1957); W. WARNER, SOCIAL CLASS IN AMERICA: THE EVALUATION OF STATUS (1960). For an
attempt to apply the concept of social stratification on an international level, see I. HOROWITZ,
THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT (1966).
'
4Galbraith, The Polipollutionists, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1967, at 52, 54 (emphasis added). Note also
the following statement: "Our ecological crisis is the product of an emerging, entirely novel,
democratic culture. The issue is whether a democratized world can survive its own implications.
Presumably we cannot unless we rethink our axioms . . . . What people do about their ecology
depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them." White, The
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it might even be "democratic" at some future date to destroy the world
if, on a majority cumulative vote, people were tired of life-or of their
respective neighbors. Such a result assumes, of course, that the herd
instinct would have become so ingrained that anarchy and the suppres-
sion of the weak by the strong would not subvert the "democratic"
process, and that typically undemocratic programs such as eugenics and
survival selection would not be instituted. Utopian democracy on such
a world scale would mature into a monster and collapse from the ine-
luctable modality and logic of its own laws.
III. THE OBLIGATION: THE RELEVANCE OF RATIONALITY
It is the unique adaptive characteristic of man that he can, to para-
phrase Alfred Korzybski, "time-bind"55 his past and present knowledge
in accretive socio-cultural processes so that he can plan for his future
not only on the basis of what he is but of what he can become. It is this
accretive process that moved Newton to paraphrase Bernard of
Chartres's statement: "We are like Dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of
giants."56 Man is distinguished from other animals by his ability to
exercise rational thought in guiding his socio-cultural development.
However, it is sometimes the case that man's technological advance-
ment outdistances his immediate cultural and political environment, and
in these cases the potentiality for constructive benefits or destructive
consequences is less susceptible to intelligent control.
Yet, it is perhaps unfair to make modern technology the scapegoat
of all our social and ecological ills. The pessimistic attitude-that tech-
nology has become an end in itself, that it subjects man to its demands
rather than serves human needs, that it is inherently destructive of per-
sonal freedom, and that it will make the world totally uninhabitable or
at least deprive it of all hope and beauty-is based upon a vast oversim-
plification. The converse-that technology is a universal solvent which
has not only liberated Western man from the bondage of poverty and
disease but will assure global prosperity and universal happiness for
Historical Root of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203, 1204-05 (1967). See also Yeager,
Technology vs. Liberty, 54 A.B.A.J. 759 (1968).
r.i [B]y nature we are time-binders and . . . the effectiveness of our time binding capacity
is not only a function of time but is . . .a logarithmic or exponential function of time-a
function in which time (7) enters as an exponent, as in the expression PRT, so that we
humans are, unlike animals, naturally qualified not only to progress, but to progress
more and more rapidly, with an always accelerating acceleration, as the generations
pass. A. KORZYBSKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITY 91-92 (1921).
"
8See Lewis, Book Review, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 162, 163 (1965).
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future generations if only applied vigorously-is likewise simplistic. 7
There is a more rational and balanced attitude:
Between these two extremes lies the view of those who recognize that
benefit and injury alike may flow from technology, which after all, is
nothing more than a systematic way of altering the environment. They
recognize that the quality of life has been greatly improved by technol-
ogical advance and would deteriorate rapidly in a period of technologi-
cal stagnation; that technological culture, already adopted by one third
of the human race and eagerly sought by much of the remaining two
thirds, could be abandoned only at the cost of relegating hundreds of
millions of human beings to suffering and death. The choice, from this
perspective, is not between the abandonment of technology as a tool
of human aspiration and the uncontrolled pursuit of technology as
though more tools invariably meant a better life. The choice, rather,
is between technological advance that proceeds without adequate con-
sideration of its consequences and technological change that is influ-
enced by a deeper concern for the interaction between man's tools and
the human environment in which they do their work s.5
Aggressive behavior and killing inhibitions represent one example
among many in which phylogenetically adapted behavior mechanisms
are thrown out of balance by the rapid changes wrought in human
ecology and sociology by technological development. However, it is the
function of man's responsive rationality to reestablish a tolerable equi-
librium between his phylogenetic instincts and the requirements of a
culturally evolved social order. In this regard, it can be argued that
man's unique time-binding ability imposes a rational responsibility on
man to plan his future, hopefully, so as to prevent the self-destruction
of the human species.
Stated another way, it is the task of mankind, exercising its respon-
sive rationality, to create and maintain in a future-directed fashion
accretive socio-cultural inclinations which will effectively control natu-
ral instincts that might otherwise become self destructive. Representa-
tive of an approach to this task are the growing number of welfare
functions which have been added to the bulk of traditional inter-state
57For a discussion of these and other oversimplified views about technology, see E. Mesthene,
The Role of Technology in Society in HARVARD UNIVERSITY PROGRAM ON TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIETY, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 1967-1968, at 41-43 (1968). See also E. MESTHENE, TECHNOL-
OGICAL CHANGE (1970).
" REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT
AND CHOICE, COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2-3
(July 1969) (emphasis removed).
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relations." A new body of social and public interest international law
has been created in response to the increasing needs in the areas of
health, food, transportation and conservation of life sustaining re-
sources. Concurrently, a totally new field of international economic
development aid has been thrust into being by a rising apprehension
over the minimum standards of living on an international, as opposed
to a national scale. There is also a growing awareness of the need for a
corpus of transnational law relating to mankind's ecological pollution
and global environment. The administration of these new international
interests has produced a multitude of public international organizations,
the internal administration of which has promoted a fast-developing
body of international administrative law." These recent manifestations
of a broadening perspective and concern over the welfare of all men
provide the basis for a qualified avowal of optimism.
Nonetheless, in attempting to fulfill his rational responsibility, man's
approach must be self-consciously eclectic as opposed to the present
affinity towards extensive specialization leading to compartmentalized
learning. The need today is for a more integrative analysis. Modern
optimal decision theory may provide the insight and understanding for
a mutual reevaluation of nationally espoused ideological outlooks and
thus establish the basis for the necessary mankind perspective, or
"transnational consciousness," in today's pluralistic international so-
ciety. Such analysis attempts to determine the appropriate evaluative
method for policy determination when information levels are imperfect
and varied.
IV. THE STRATEGY: DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM
The search for a strategy which would allow for optimal decisions in
the evaluation and choice of policies is not new. But today the need of
such an approach for resolving international conflicts and for preserving
the welfare of mankind in general has reached ominous proportions.
The ideal strategy would be synoptic, all-comprehensive, totally integra-
tive and account for all present and future variables and all linear,
extensional and structural changes. The synoptic ideal is, however, only
an ideal." It is not adapted to (1) man's limited problem solving capaci-
5See E. HAAS, supra note 21, at 461; G. MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 176 (1960);
B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED SOCIETY (1960).
"
0See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 40, at 191.
01 Comprehensiveness is often seen as logically necessary for rational choice; in fact,
rational choice comes close to being defined as a choice that, inter alia, responds to a
comprehensive consideration of all relevant variables. Herbert A. Simon has written,
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ties, (2) the inadequacy of information, (3) the costliness of analysis, (4)
the failure in constructing a satisfactory evaluative method, (5) the
closeness of observed relationships between fact and value in policymak-
ing, (6) the openness of the systems of variables with which it contends,
(7) the analyst's need for strategic sequences of analytical moves and
(8) the diverse forms in which policy problems actually arise." The
failure to adapt to teleological variables and also latent dysfunctionality
might also be added to this list. 3
Bentham's utilitarian felicific calculus of the "greatest happiness for
"Rational choice will be feasible to the extent that the limited set of factors upon which
decision is based corresponds, in nature, to a closed system of variables-that is, to the
extent that significant indirect effects are absent."
It is generally conceded, of course, that such comprehensiveness is an ideal rather than
an achievement. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 39 (1963),
citing H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 83 (1959).
See also J. March & H. Simon, The Concept of Rationality, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES 340-43 (J. Singer
ed. 1965).
"
2See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 47-57. Even the most advanced
electronic computers are unable to provide practical synoptic solutions. It has been estimated that
A. L. Samuel's checkers-playing machine would require 1021 centuries, supposing that it worked
as fast as the fastest imaginable computer, to explore every possible path leading to the end of a
game of checkers. A. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers,
3 I.B.M. J. RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 211-12 (1959). Obviously, calculation would not be
practical unless it departed from synoptic principles. See Winograd, How Fast Can Computers
Add? SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Oct. 1968, at 93. Similar findings have been published recently by
other I.B.M. researchers:
The speed with which the fastest computers do their job has increased a thousand-fold
during the last 15 years, from 16,000 to 16 million additions a second. Their logic circuits
process electrical signals about 2.5 million times faster than does a human nerve cell
with all its processes.
But even this is not fast enough for certain computing tasks-weather forecasting, for
example. It takes 12 hours for a computer to produce a 24-hour forecast. By the time it
is finished, half the forecast period is gone and the situation has changed. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 29, 1968, § I, at 57, col. 1.
"
3Note, however, that teleology need not necessarily imply that an end-out-view controls or
directs social change. Generally, the concept is associated with the doctrine that "goals or ends of
activity are dynamic agents in their own realizations." E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE
402 (1961).
Latent dysfunctionality may arise in all policies which attempt to solve polycentric social prob-
lems. No social catalyst produces only one effect; each has both the desired effect and a host of
side effects. In empirical socio-political analysis, the latent dysfunctional problem is to control and
direct future sequential effects of current policies. See R. Merton, Social Problems and Sociologi-
cal Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 697 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961). For
an example of latent dysfunctionality because of only unidimensional success in socially engineer-
ing a change in female mobilization in Central Asia, see Massell, Law as an Instrument of
Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 179 (1968).
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the greatest number" can be viewed as an example of a synoptic, or all
comprehensive, strategy for decision making.64
The felicific calculus, it will be recalled, presumes that the utility of
an action (or policy) can be reduced to the "value of a lot of pleasure
or pain." The value of a lot is to be measured by first taking each
pleasure and pain that the action will produce and considering, for
each person affected, its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty,
propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, and purity, and then considering
the number of persons to whom it extends. The plus measurements of
the pleasures in the lot and the minus measurements of the pains are
combined to reach an algebraic sum or "balance," "which, if on the
side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with
respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if
on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same
community." Thus in principle, every policy in any set of alternative
policies can be ranked vis-a-vis all the rest according to the score that
the calculus assigns to its consequences.15
The intelligibility of utilitarianism-that doctrine in which the useful
is the good, and the determining consideration of right conduct should
be the usefulness of its consequences-can be criticized for its lack of a
definite interpersonal calculus in spite of Bentham's proposals. Of
course it might be asked what the functional use of such a calculus
would be if in fact it could be made definite. It would first be necessary
to draw attention to the difference between specification or description
of the problem solving strategy, on the one hand, and of a solved prob-
lem on the other; and, perhaps for the simple reason that the strategy
is part of the process itself, it cannot be made functionally definite. For
example: "Michael Polanyi calls attention to the difference between
specification . . . and [on the other hand] a solved problem . . . . To
ride a bicycle, he says, it is necessary at any given angle of unbalance
for the rider to give a turn to the front wheel that is by some measure
inversely proportional to the square of the speed at which he is proceed-
ing. If this method specifies a solution for the cyclist, would anyone try
to ride by making these calculations?""6
The intelligibility of utilitarianism can also be criticized for its lack
"See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-31
(1907) (reprint of 2d ed. 1823).
I'D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 214.
"Ild. at 44-45, citing M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 49-50 (1958). See also Moynihan,
To Solve Problem, First Define It, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1970, (Annual Education Review) at 49,
col. 6.
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of a rule for cutting off accounts of consequences; that is, closing the
value system so that information inputs will stabilize for processing and
so that the decision itself can be made. Since policy proposals as well
as the policies themselves are constantly being superseded or reshaped,
it can be criticized for its lack of a rule for specifying the reference group
for which consequences are to be considered.
Furthermore, utilitarianism can be criticized as being end or goal
dependent. "While the conventional view of problem solving is that
means are adjusted to ends (policies are sought that will attain certain
objectives), it is a significant aspect of policy analysis as actually prac-
ticed that, in certain specific ways, the reverse adjustment also takes
place." 7 Thus, Ernst Nagel has stated the doctrine that "goals or ends
of activity are dynamic agents in their own realizations.""8
The need in the process of international conflicts resolution is to
achieve an effectuating strategy which would facilitate an adjustment of
the ends or objectives of policies to the means. It can be argued that
nationalistic goals, such as regional supremacy and ideological implan-
tation, may have to be adjusted to or supplanted by new goals, such as
species preservation. In the final analysis, such a change will come about
only if parochial attitudes and naive values are replaced with a mankind
perspective. Even if the world were viewed as a spaceship with limited
resources for sustaining the crew, survival of the human species would
still depend upon some means of decision making which would be in
turn founded on a complex and high level of integrative evaluation.
Messrs. Braybrooke and Lindblom have convincingly argued that the
disjointed incrementalistic strategy for decision making, whereby mar-
ginal dependent or incremental choices are decided singularly in an on-
going but reversible order, is best suited for such polycentric and multi-
variate problems:
Let us describe this kind of political decision-making in more detail.
It is decision-making through small or incremental moves on particu-
lar problems rather than through a comprehensive reform program. It
is also endless; it takes the form of an indefinite sequence of policy
ID. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 93.
68E. NAGEL, supra note 63, at 402. Messrs. Braybrooke and Lindblom have noted that, "[s]ince
the reverse adjustment is superimposed on the conventionally conceived adjustment of means to
end, the net result is a reciprocal relationship between means and ends or between policies and
values that is different from that envisaged in the synoptic ideal. Although there is a fundamental
sense in which ends govern means, there is an equally fundamental sense in which the proximate
ends of public policy are governed by means." D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61,
at 93.
[Vol. 3: 271
SYSTEMS THEORY OF INT'L LAW
moves. Moreover, it is exploratory in that the goals of policy-making
continue to change as new experience with policy throws new light on
what is possible and desirable. In this sense, it is also better described
as moving away from known social ills rather than as moving toward
a known and relatively stable goal. In any case, it is policy-making that
chooses those goals that draw policies forward in the light of what
recent policy steps have shown to be probably realizable; the utopian
goal, chosen for its attractiveness without thought of its feasibility, is
not a heavy influence on this kind of policy-making. In the frequency
with which past moves are found wanting and new moves debated, it
reveals both man's limited capacities to understand and solve complex
problems and an unsettled, shifting compromise of conflicting values.6"
This incremental strategy seems able to overcome the general objec-
tions refuting the synoptic ideal insofar as it directs policy toward spe-
cific ills in its remedial function; it provides for segmented and long term
change in its serial function; and it adjusts its goals to reflect new
experience in its exploratory function. Inherent in the disjointed incre-
mentalistic strategy are a number of adaptations which overcome the
adaptive failings of the synoptic ideal discussed above. These adapta-
tions can be summarized as: (1) margin-dependent choice; (2) restricted
variety of policy alternatives considered; (3) restricted examination of
consequences for any given policy; (4) adjustment of objectives to poli-
cies, or ends to means; (5) reconstructive treatment of data; (6) serial
analysis and evaluation; (7) remedial orientation of analysis and evalua-
tion; and (8) social fragmentation of analysis and evaluation."
It is not suggested here that the strategy of disjointed incrementalism
is most suited for all kinds of decisions and situations. As shown in
Figure 1 below,7' disjointed incrementalism as an analytical strategy is
most appropriate in those areas in which there is a relatively low level
of comprehensive understanding and incremental change is necessitated
due to the polycentricity of the problem which is attempting to be
I'D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 71. See also id. at 111-43.
7
"Id. at 83-110.
When we speak of disjointed incrementalism as a strategy for analysis, we mean only
to describe one set of practices that, however subtly and idiosyncratically each mind
works, represents a point convergence for policy analysts in their adaptations to the
difficulties of problem solving and evaluation. The set of adaptations is relatively simple,
crude, almost wholly conscious, and public; it can be discussed with the same concepts
and language that were employed in discussing the synoptic ideal. We do not need to
use the language, for example, of sensor-motor coordinations, perceptive organizations,
or concept formation (as psychologists study it). Id. at 82.
"Figure I is a modification of Diagram 2 in id. at 78.
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solved, due to the unknown nature of the effects of the intermediate
stages and due to the possibility of structural or end-goal changes.
FIGURE 1: Types of Decision-Making
HIGH
COMPREHENSIVE
UNDERSTANDING
Quadrant 2
Some Administrative and
"Technical" Decision-
Making
Analytical Method:
Mini-Synoptic
INCREMENTAL
CHANGE
Quadrant 3
Incremental Politics,
Polycentric Problems
Analytical Method:
Disjointed Incre-
mentalism
~1~
Quadrant 1
Revolutionary and
Utopian Decision-
Making
Analytical Method:
None (Synoptic Ideal)
LARGE
CHANGE
Quadrant 4
Wars, Revolutions,
Crises, and "Grand
Opportunities"
Analytical Method:
Naive Criteria, Naive
Priorities, or Visceral
High-Risk
LOW
COMPREHENSIVE
UNDERSTANDING
Synoptic methods are limited generally to the second quadrant in
Figure 1 (above), that is, "to those happy if limited circumstances
in which decisions effect sufficiently small change to make synoptic
understanding possible.""2 The limited forms of the synoptic strategy as
employed in the second quadrant can be termed "mini-synoptic." The
more ideal synoptic methods for policy determination and evaluation
are needed for the first quadrant; however, as discussed above, the
"Id. at 78-79.
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information and comprehension requirements of synoptic problem solv-
ing simply cannot be met for resulting large scale social change. "It is
of course the careless assumption that man's competence is unlimited
that makes utopian reconstruction so attractive."" As for the fourth
quadrant, crises, wars, revolutions and "grand opportunities" call for
kinds of analytical strategy which are quite different from the synoptic,
but it cannot be claimed that the disjointed incrementalistic strategy is
best suited for these situations either. Aside from some "visceral" or
emotive high risk strategy, it is difficult, if not presently impossible, to
formalize the evaluative methods appropriate to that quadrant.
An empirical example of decision making within the third quadrant,
as diagramed in Figure 1 above, may be delineated in terms of current
international legal relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States. It can be argued that the emerging "new" approach to public
international lawmaking, in our pluralistic world of legal value systems,
concentrates on that same pragmatic, empirically based, problem ori-
ented, step by step, or disjointed incrementalistic strategy for conflicts
resolution. The coexistence theme of the Cold War era implied a static
or quiescent approach to East-West legal relations. While the Soviets
stressed ideological struggle, class conflict and fear of "capitalistic en-
circlement," the Americans in this period underwent the purges of
McCarthyism and the Red Scare tactics which successfully instilled
mass fear of "monolithic communism" and "creeping socialism." In
contrast, the cooperation theme of the post Cold War era has implied
a dynamic mutual and consensual approach to East-West legal rela-
tions. This current period, characterized as that of a Soviet-Western
dMtente, has established what some juristic commentators have termed
"new" public international law. As one commentator has stated:
In a sense, the international law of the dMtente, constructed on a prag-
matic basis of inter-systems agreement or consensus, and demon-
strated empirically in the actual record of such defacto accommoda-
tions and give-and-take, represents a species of "new" international
law.[74] At least, it represents a new gloss on the old customary interna-
tional law, albeit a gloss that is specially concerned, in the special
societal conditions of the contemporary world community, with con-
siderations of security, of stability, or settled expectations, and of
certainty and the avoidance of surprise in inter-group (more accu-
"Id. at 79.
7
"McWhinney, Changing International Law Method and Objectives in the Era of the Soviet-
Western Detente, 59 A. J. 1. L. 1 (1965).
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rately inter-systems) relations-the old "Watchman's State" legal 004
virtues .
This new international lawmaking of the East-West dtente
concentrates on the pragmatic, empirically based approach to conflicts
resolution. Practical application of this particular approach requires
peaceful, consensual change as the operational methodology. However,
nations faced with particular tension issues within the present day world
community must avoid "temptations to abstract, a priori, natural-law-
type exercises in general acts of codification, uno actu, of asserted prin-
ciples of coexistence.""6 Any effort at deductive postulation from the
seemingly self evident general principles of Soviet-Western juristic rela-
tions would be likely to result in some form of a natural law absolutism.
In view of all the possibilities of semantic confusion and normative
equivocality between the two sociopolitical systems, such exercises
would be of little practical value when contrasted with the actual con-
duct of international relations. For this reason, it is perhaps more accur-
ate to speak of "new" international lawmaking rather than the "new"
international law.
The self initiative function is another important aspect of the "new"
approach to public international lawmaking in the era of the East-West
dMtente which should be mentioned. In a rare interview with the Western
press in 1963, Premier Khrushchev epitomized this aspect by the phrase
"politic of mutual example." 7 His reference was indeed an apt one to
indicate that category of international lawmaking which typically in-
volves a unilateral initiative by either the Soviet or the Western bloc in
I 5McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The United Nations'
Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 60 A. J. 1. L. 1, 2
(1966) (footnote renumbered and rewritten). See generally E. MCWHINNEY, "PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE" AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-51, 112-26 (1964); B. RAMUNDO,
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM 1-42, 216-29
(1967); A. ULAN, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE 695-752 (1968); G. ZADOROZHNYI, PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE (1968). See also Fenwick, International Law: The Old and the New, 60 A. J. I. L.
475 (1966); Hazard, Legal Research on "Peaceful Coexistence," 51 A. J. 1. L. 63 (1957); Hazard,
Pragmatic View of the New International Law, (1963) PROC. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 79-83; Hazard,
Co-existence, Co-operation, and the Common Law, in LAW, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE EAST-
WEST DtTENTE 18 (E. McWhinney ed. 1964); Hazard, Co-existence Law Bows Out, 59 A.J.I.L.
59 (1965); H ouben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States, 61 A.J.I.L. 703-36 (1967).
76McWhinney, supra note 75, at 2. Compare the statement by the Soviet Jurist, Gregori Tunkin,
from G. TUNKIN, IDEOLOGICHESKAIA BORBA I MEXHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [Ideological Struggle and
International Law] (Moscow 1967), which is translated in Book Review, 62 A.J.I. L. 209 (1968).
"N.S. Khrushchev's Answers to Questions of H. Shapiro, Chief Moscow Correspondent of
American Wire Service United Press International, from Izvestia, Dec. 31, 1963, at 1, translated
in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 52, Jan. 22, 1964, at 24.
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the confident expectation that pressure from world public opinion will
inevitably force the other bloc to follow suit. An early example of this
"self-initiative" aspect was the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty of
August 1963, which simply ratified and concretized in certain particu-
lars a fundamental accommodation or detente that had already oc-
curred defacto between the two systems. The Western initiative leading
to the establishment of the "Hot Line" emergency communications
system between the Kremlin and the White House" and the similar
initiative leading to the Soviet-Western accord on preventing the orbit-
ing of nuclear weapons in space vehicles, which itself was embodied in
a United Nations General Assembly resolution,79 are two other exam-
ples. The process of international lawmaking incorporated by the "self-
initiative" or "politic of mutual example" is also apparent "in the rap-
idly successive Soviet and Western decisions as to reductions in arms
expenditure; as to the cessation of interference in each other's radio
propaganda programs; as to the reduction in uranium production and
even the closing of nuclear reactor plants."' "
Other examples of the "new" international lawmaking of the detente
era which reflect the incremental approach to resolution of Soviet-
Western conflicts and the reliance on exemplary unilateral action to
effect mutual change, are the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space,8' and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. 2
Similarly, it is obvious that comprehensive international treaties and
conventions are needed to resolve international environment conflicts.
There is growing concern over our global environment which transcends
purely national interests, and it is foreseeable that in the near future a
body of transnational environmental law will be developed. The United
States itself has taken a major step toward recognizing the desirability
of encouraging international cooperation in the preservation of our
world environment. Title I, section 102(E) of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 states:
7U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement for Direct Communications Link, White House Statement,
June 20, 1963. in 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (1963).
"G.A. Res. 1884, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
I'McWhinney, supra note 74, at 8.
"Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (effective October 10, 1967).
"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, [19701 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. 6839 (effective March 5, 1970). See also Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical
Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEo WASH. L. REV.
308 (1967).
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The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set
forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
(E) recognize the world-wide and long-range character of environ-
mental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the
United States, lend appropriate support to initiative, resolutions, and
programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipat-
ing and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environ-
ment .... "I
Furthermore, there are indications of increased international cooper-
ation in the area of environmental control. Plans are being drafted by a
"task force" of specialists at the National Academy of Sciences for a
global network to warn of environmental changes which threaten life
forms. 4 The theme of the Fifth World Conference on World Peace
Through Law and World Assembly of Judges, which was held July 21-
25, 1971, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, was the "Law of the World and
Man's Environment. '8 5 The 22-nation Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), whose members include the
United States, Canada, Japan and 19 Western European countries, has
announced its intention to establish international tolerance limits for
environmental pollutants. Countries who exceed the limits would pay
indemnities. However, since the organization operates by voluntary
compliance, and since there is no enforcement mechanism, it cannot be
assumed that all the members will adhere to the standards of environ-
mental control."' 114 countries were represented at the recent United
Nations international environmental conference held at Stockholm
from June 5 to 16, 1972.7 Worldwide consciousness of environmental
-42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). See also Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the
Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970); Oppenheimer & Miller,
Environmental Problems and Legislative Responses, 389 ANNALS 77 (1970); Sax, Emerging Legal
Strategies: Judicial Intervention, 389 ANNALS 71 (1970). As a more recent indication of the United
States intention, in his message to Congress concerning the Administration's 1972 Environmental
Program, President Nixon proposed a "voluntary United Nations Fund for the Environment" with
an initial funding goal of $100 million for the first five years. The President indicated that if this
fund is established he would recommend to Congress that the "United States commit itself to
provide its fair share of the Fund on a matching basis. H.R. Doc. No. 92-247, 92d Cong.
2d Sess. 844 (1972).
"
4N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1970, at 1, cols. 6-7. See Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A
Proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 401 (1970).
"Thompson, The Belgrade World Peace Through Law Conference, 57 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1971).
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 10, col. 1.
tSee The Japan Times, June 6, 1972, at 1, cols. 5-8; id., June 7, 1972, at I, cols. 5-8; id., June
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matters was undoubtedly heightened by this conference. Of the 186
recommendations before the conference, approximately 100 were
adopted. The most important of the adopted recommendations covered
a wide range of proposals establishing a so-called "Earth Watch," a
global system of monitoring and assessing pollution of the air, earth and
water. Other recommendations of importance included an international
referral system to pool and distribute environmental data, and the estab-
lishment of a new Environmental Agency within the United Nations.
This agency will be empowered to initiate and finance its own environ-
mental programs. It will also have powers to constantly assess and
review all new environmental programs undertaken by other United
Nations agencies. The conference also produced a "Declaration on the
Human Environment" which was adopted without dissent and without
a vote at the closing session. This tactic was utilized to meet the Chinese
assertion that they would not participate in a vote because the document
contained unacceptable points. This declaration is in itself a remarkable
document and could become the equivalent of a Declaration of Human
Rights for the environment. Since all actions at the Conference were
accomplished by way of recommendation none of the participants were
bound by its results. Perhaps the most significant achievement of the
conference was the fact that the delegates from 114 nations recognized
the importance of conducting environmental conservation on a global
basis and confirmed their respective nations' "international responsibili-
ties" for our earth's environmental disruption.
Optimistically, it can be hoped that the developing national, as well
as international, consensus concerning environmental protection may
give impetus to the future directive role of law and legal systems, in
adequately regulating the use of air, water and land on a national as well
as a global level in the interest of mutual survival.88 Furthermore, it can
be hoped that the "new" empirically based, problem oriented, self initia-
tive approach to international lawmaking will be evidenced soon in the
area of transnational environmental law.
The "new" approach to public international lawmaking itself gains
strength and efficacy from the defacto acquiescence through normative
8, 1972, at 1, cols. 1-3; id., June 9, 1972, at I, cols. 1-3; id., June 14, 1972, at 1, cols. 1-3; id., June
16, 1972, at 5, cols. 6-8.
An eight-day symposium on international environmental problems, sponsored by the Standing
Committee on Environmental Disruption of the International Social Science Council (a United
Nations auxiliary body), was held in Tokyo, Japan, on March 9-16, 1970. Forty-five delegates,
including social scientists from 13 industrial countries, exchanged views on environmental pollution
at this meeting. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1970, at 18, col. 5 (city ed.).
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patterns of reciprocal deference and the "politic of mutual example" of
both sides. Consensually based rules of jurisprudence are the focal
points for this new international law. As Professor Edward McWhinney
has stated,
the new consensually-based rules are at least founded on reasonable-
ness, rather than (in the positivistic terms) on any mere conformity to
pre-existing authority; and the reasonableness of the rules is necessar-
ily in terms of both main competing systems, since reciprocal self-
interest is the raison d'etre of those rules. There may be, therefore, a
greater prospect of the rules being observed, long-range, by both
sides.8"
In summary, peaceful or nonviolent consensual change is increasingly
becoming the operational methodology of the "new" approach to inter-
national lawmaking. With certain limitations it can be hoped that law
will increase its efficacy as an instrument of peace and environmental
protection with the community of nations.
V. THE METHODOLOGY AND POINT OF DEPARTURE:
A TRANS-CULTURAL CONSENSUS
Significantly, it has been suggested that the peremptory objections to
utilitarianism, as discussed above, can be overcome by abandoning Ben-
tham's felicific calculus for the notion of a felicific census in alliance
with the decision making strategy of disjointed incrementalism:
Under the strategy, evaluators express their concern with meliorative
themes without necessarily, or even usually, formulating rules to em-
body the themes. Likewise, they express concern with distributive
themes without formalizing their procedures to the point of exhibiting
rigorous deductive arguments . . . . The general form of a conclusive
distributive test is that of a census-a comparative census when what
is to be tested is whether one group of people exemplifies a given
distributive property to a higher degree than another group, a prospec-
tive census when what is to be compared is the state of a given group
with respect to a distributive theme under one policy with its predicted
state under another.90
The census is prospective, just as the felicific calculus was a prospective
calculus. For example, if happiness is the given distributive theme, then
a felicific census is offered in the place of Bentham's felicific calculus.
"See Hildebrand, The Role of Law and the Legal System in Meeting Our Environmental Crisis
(currently being considered for publication in the LAW & Soc'y REV.).
'McWhinney, supra note 74, at 14.
IOD. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 177-79.
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Thus, to determine what distributive theme should be employed to
evaluate and determine intrastate policy, the policy makers of any given
nation should resort to a national value consensus.9 This would be
established in the form of a minimum agreement on the "fundamental"
attitudes which may be necessary in order that the governing system
work smoothly or at all. One basic tenet of majority democracy is that
the national value consensus must in fact play an effective role in the
determination of foreign and domestic policy.
This tenet is generally accepted in the United States as evidenced by
the political, social and economic disturbances caused by President
Nixon's military intervention in Cambodia and Laos. "On the deeper
level the national value consensus defines the limits within which the
government must act and sets the goals which our leaders are morally
obligated to pursue." 2 In the area of environmental protection, the
congressional defeat of the billion dollar supersonic transport (SST)
program may not only represent a new technological sophistication of
the American people and of their representatives in Congress, but also
a new national value consensus. Simply stated, this consensus reflects
the fundamental attitude that technology exists to serve man and that
proposals to move it ahead at great economic and environmental ex-
pense must be judged on the basis of cost-benefit analysis of the widest
and most comprehensive sort. "Underlying the disagreement on the
SST was the shared sense that consulting the public had been decisive,
.and that a new model of decision-making had been fashioned in the
process. '9 3
However, that which is regarded as "fundamental" also changes
through time; and it is for this reason, among others, that the disjointed
incrementalistic strategy, with its inherent ability to adapt to structural
change, is well suited for an alliance with the consensus approach.
We have now only to make the next logical step and suggest that a
trans-cultural consensus is the means by which a species-saving "world
democracy" might be sustained. A trans-cultural consensus necessarily
"See generally Lipsitz, Consensus: The Study of Consensus, in 3 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 266-67 (1968); Prothro & Grigg, Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases
of Agreement and Disagreement, 22 J. POLITICS 276 (1960).
2E. LEFEVER, ETHICS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 166 (1957). See generally R. DAHL,
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956);
H. MAYO, INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1960); J. ROSENAU, THE ATTENTIVE PUBLIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968); J. ROSENAU, PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY (1961);
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY (J. Rosenau ed. 1961).
"
3 N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 4 (Weekly Review), at 1, cols. 5-7, 7.
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implies a mankind perspective with an awareness of the finite nature of
the earth and its human and natural resources. In a sense the functional
logic of such a consensus has already been successfully applied through
international welfare organizations affiliated with the United Nations.
The question still remains as to whether man's intraspecific aggression
and territorial imperative behavior patterns can be redirected to insure
the long term efficacy of such an approach to international problem
solving.
At this point it should be stressed that the immediate national value
consensus and, on the man qua international society level, the trans-
cultural consensus are merely topoi or points of departure. Their norma-
tive and prescriptive content is subject to change as the units for forming
the basis of inquiry (persons, groups, communities, nations) change. 4
The national value consensus may also be affected by an enlightened
overview of the immedite problem situation, thus raising it toward a
trans-cultural consensus. Only from this viewpoint does the final dialect-
ical step acquire its functional validity.
VI. AN APPLICATION: COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In light of man's phylogenetic behavior patterns of intraspecific ag-
gression and the territorial imperative, his means for mass destruction,
the equally destructive population explosion and the exhaustion and
pollution of the earth's limited life sustaining resources, one might as-
sume a pessimistic outlook on the future of man as a continuing species.
If carried to its logical conclusion, this pessimism might lead to the
fatalistic realization that no action employed to abate the onslaught of
the annihilation of the human species could be either worthwhile or
ultimately effective. Why, then, don't we take Schopenhauer's advice
and stop procreating and bring this whole farce to an end? The answer
may be that an optimistic avowal, based on some cogent underlying
rationale and instigated by man's responsive rationality, might be used
to teleologically effectuate that which is relatively positive-namely the
accretive socio-cultural development of the human species.
Education, including the "parental" and heuristic function of our
legal system, has been used as an effective cultural equalizer and as a
means for instilling nationalism and for purging our pluralistic society
of ethnocentric values and beliefs which might question the all-
"For an excellent work on cultural change, see D. MARTINDALE, SOCIAL LIFE AND CULTURAL
CHANGE (1962).
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conclusiveness of American democracy.9" Just as man's phylogenetic
behavior patterns of intraspecific aggression and the territorial impera-
tive are culturally determined, they may also be culturally controlled.
By orienting the world populace toward a mankind perspective, or what
Professor Richard Falk has termed "transnational consciousness,""6
education may provide the necessary means to effectuate a consensual,
and species-saving, world democracy.
Nationalism has heretofore been a necessary and viable concept in the
preservation of opposing nation-states which have operated under cul-
turally determined and rationally deductive value systems. 7 Now, how-
ever, international situations and conflict relationships have become too
complex and integrated to be comprehensively handled by such simplis-
tic evaluative methods. Monochromatic nationalism and the methodol-
ogy under which it operates must be sacrificed in the interests of species
preservation, lest all mankind fall victim to the inexcusable failure to
employ the more integrative and selectively open evaluative method of
which it is capable, and which is most suited for optimal decision mak-
ing and prediction.
As shown in Figure 7 (pages 316-17 below), man has the unique
capacity which enables him to process information on a high data inte-
gration index level.
The difference between man and higher order animals lies not so much
in the ability to learn or to utilize the meanings of a large number of
stimuli, but rather in the ability to learn and to utilize alternate mean-
ings of the same stimulus and to build up and use different patterns of
interrelationships within the same set of meanings. This change, from
lower to higher levels of thought, is a matter of degree, paralleling the
evolutionary scale across species and developing with age (to an upper
neurological limit under optimal environmental conditions) within
species."
However, man seldom employs the highest and most comprehensive
evaluative method for policy determination. Failure to capitalize on his
unique potential is most evident on the international scale, where the
"Compare Hildebrand, The Sociology of Soviet Law: The Heuristic and "'Parental" Functions,
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157 (1971). See also Schubert, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Change,
16 J. PUBLIC L. 16 (1967); Schubert, Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication, 61 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 106 (1967).
"N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1969, at 10, col. I. See R. FALK, supra note 5.
'See discussion in text accompanying notes 114-16 infra.
11H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S. STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING: INDIVIDUALS
AND GROUPS FUNCTIONING IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SITUATIONS 5 (1967).
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complexity of problems requires a method, such as the disjointed incre-
mentalistic strategy, which operates on the high data integration index
level. National value determinations have heretofore constrained man
in the area of international policy determinations to operation on only
a moderately high integration index level, thus resulting in a "refusal"
to emply the higher methodology.99 Only on the high integrative plane
can man hope to reach optimal decisions, which are necessary for ulti-
mate species preservation and adaptation. A brief explanation of all the
index levels and their representative evaluative methods and analytical
models will reveal the efficacy of operating on the highest integrative
level. Furthermore, it will illustrate the ability of the disjointed incre-
mentalistic strategy to transcend cultural determinations in its evalua-
tive approach to the necessary optimal decisions.
An adaptive system, such as the general system of public international
law, must be capable of processing and evaluating information inputs
to achieve stability in this dynamic and fluid universe. Given the Hera-
clitean assumption that unless the changing variety of the immediate
environment is successfully mapped and effective correctional adjust-
ments made, in either the environment or the system, the system itself
cannot survive in the long run. 00 "The system must be open and capable
of information processing. Thus, at a minimum it can detect the dispar-
ity between various states that are relevant to its functioning, and iden-
tify the cause or nature of a disparity that must be corrected."'' Logi-
cally, the adaptive system must then be able to respond in such a way
as to attain the desired state of relative equilibrium.0 2
For analytical purposes it is possible to identify four benchmarks
along the continuum of adaptive systems ranging from a low to a high
degree of openness, differentiation, and interdependence at which man
is capable of functioning. These four complexity levels have been identi-
fied and discussed at length by Messrs. Schroder, Driver and Streu-
fert.0 3 These levels are paralleled somewhat by George Mead's four
"On the role of nationalism in world affairs, see A. GYORGY & G. BLACKWOOD, supra note 21,
at 169-90. On the historical sociology and the future of nationalism, see E. HAAS, supra note 21.
See generally K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1969); K. Deutsch, supra note
20.
"'Lewis, supra note 10, at 389-90. See generally W. BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYS-
TEMS THEORY (1967); W. Buckley, Society as a Complex Adaptive System, in MODERN SYSTEMS
RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
"'Lewis, supra note 10, at 390.
"'1See Notterman & Trumball, Note on Self-Regulating Systems and Stress, 4 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 324 (1959).
"
3See H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S. STREUFERT, supra note 98, at 15-23.
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basic personality orientations, of "I" (self-reference, egocentrism),
"me" (delineation of self), the "significant other" (broader social
perspective), and the "generalized other" (characterized by alternate
standards and generalizations emerging from experience with various
ranges of social perspectives).' 4
At the man qua man level of relationship complexity, where the
perspective is generally egocentric or self referent, each individual seeks,
over and above his biological needs, his own integrity and destiny. How-
ever, when he employs the "naive criteria evaluative method" with its
inherent low integration index, he necessarily limits his analytical model
to that of a closed system with fixed responses and little deviation. The
''naive criteria evaluative method" is a relatively primitive approach
which holds that merely announcing a few general values, for example,
"security," "employment," and "price stability," supplies enough eval-
uative machinery to propel descriptive knowledge toward definite policy
recommendations. 105
The low integration index can be diagrammed as follows:
FIGURE 2: Descriptive Model
for Low Integration Index
E
In this diagram, E (the cross hatched column) represents the environ-
ment of the system S; while D, D and D 3 are the areas of perceived
"'See G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934). See also the classification of games by
Anderson and Moore in Autotelic Folk-Models, I SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 203 (1960).
1'D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 6.
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dimensions of E; and C is the content variable. "At [this level] the
adaptive system is minimally open to the environment and exhibits a low
degree of differentiation and interdependence. At the same time, how-
ever, there is a high degree of order, a relatively low degree of freedom,
and a concomitant predictability in the behavior of the system. The
constrained variety of the environment is related in a static or fixed way,
thus minimally affecting the system's information processing opera-
tions."106 In terms of decision theory analysis, C in Figure 2 can be said
to represent the set of evaluative determinants, and D 1' D and D 3 are
the resulting possible decision outputs.
If even this simple system is to be adaptive, it must also meet the
minimal requirements of detection, identification and control for self-
adjustment and regulation. These minimal adaptive requirements can be
diagrammed as shown in Figure 3 below.
FIGURE 3:
I
Adaptive Model
for Low Integration Index
In this diagram, R in system S represents a receptor capable of detecting
and identifying the change (disequilibrium) of a state, dimension, or
value of the environment D between time t and t2 . Information is
manipulated by the content variable in accordance with the fixed adop-
'"Lewis, supra note 10, at 391.
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tive criteria that causes an effect E I to produce the desired state [D] t3 "
The newly established desired state [D] t3 is now detected, identified,
and compared with the end goal desired state by the control mechanism
of the system." 7
At this point, a distinction should be made between "complexity" and
"order." Entropy is a mathematical factor which is used to measure the
unavailable energy in a thermodynamic system and the amount of disor-
der in a physical system. Entropy can also be used to describe the lack
of information about the structure of a system. This lack of information
corresponds to the actual disorder or dissonance at a particular com-
plexity level. An increase of entropy corresponds to the progressive loss
of information, for example, by the attenuation of a sequence of pulses
sent along an electric cable. In general, it can be said that "order" is
equivalent to negentropy,l° a quantitative measurement of information,
which may increase or decrease while complexity, or the integrative
level of the system's analyzing process, remains constant. The following
simple example clarifies this point:
When a crystal of common salt grows regularly to twice its previous
size, its entropy decreases; that is, it has increased its order. But its
complexity is the same; verifiable observations on it mah be described
by a statement involving the same number of parameters as before. If
on the other hand, there is present in the solution an atom of a sodium
isotope and this atom becomes incorporated into the crystal, the com-
plexity of theoretically verifiable observations on the isotope atom in
relation to the rest of the crystal demands more parameters for its full
description. If, now, the crystal is repeatedly redissolved and a new
crystal formed, the isotope atom is unlikely to occupy the same posi-
tion on each occasion; treating the successive appearances of the crys-
tal as a single system, the additional information about the position
of the isotope atom is not verifiable. This system cannot therefore be
said to have evolved, since no new ordered relationships are estab-
lished. Nothing can be stated about the incorporation of the isotope
atom at a particular point in the crystal except that it is improbable,
and no progressive change can be observed in the system.109
"See MacKay, Towards an Information-Flow Model of Human Behavior, 47 BRITISH J. OF
PSYCHOLOGY 30, 31-32 (1956).
'"
0
"Negentropy" is a term coined by Edwin Schr6dinger to represent negative entropy. See E.
SCHRODINGER, WHAT IS LIFE? (1949); Brillouin, Life, Thermodynamics, and Cybernetics, 37
AMERICAN SCIENTIST 554 (1949); L. BRILLOUIN, SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 8
(1964). See generally P. LANDSBERG, ENTROPY AND THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1961); Withrow,
Entropy, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 526-28 (1967). See also N. KOZYREV, CAUSATIVE
OR ASYMMETRICAL MECHANICS IN LINEAR APPROXIMATION (1958), discussed in BULLETIN OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE U.S.S.R., Mar. 1960, at 39.
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For the purposes of this article, man's intraspecies aggression and the
territorial imperative can be viewed as examples of phylogenetic behav-
ior patterns which operate at the low integration index level; and, char-
acteristically, dogmatic and narrow-minded, or unidimensional, think-
ing is done at this naive criteria level. There is an obvious parallel
between this level of thought and the "behavior" of molecular interac-
tion and simple machines, as shown in Figure 7 (pages 316-17 below).
"Lower order organisms operate at this level, as do brain damaged
humans most of the time, and the rest of us, hopefully, only some of
the time.'''' 0
A common gesture toward improving the naive criteria evaluation
method which increases the level of complexity and allows the decision
maker to operate on the moderately low integrative index level, takes
the form of the naive priorities method. While this method takes the
difficulty of conflicting values into account, its defect is that it goes no
further than to merely rank all the content values to be considered in
terms of priorities. Thus, it may place "freedom" ahead of "economic
growth" and "economic growth" ahead of "equality;" or "combatting
unemployment" ahead of "combatting inflation" and both of these
goals ahead of "restoring competition." '' At the moderately low inte-
grative index level, man acts with less dependance on his environment
and mentally fixed responses and, concurrently, with more differentia-
tion in his thought processes. The naive priorities evaluative method
with its ranking order methodology is characteristic at this level of
information processing, and the appropriate analytical model is the
homeostatic or simple cybernetics."'
It is helpful for understanding the theory of complexity analysis, as
presented herein, to distinguish between two types of systems variables:
"Pringle, On the Parallel Between Learning and Evolution, 3 BEHAVIOUR 174, 176-77 (1951).
"
0Lewis, supra note 10, at 391. See generally Deutsch, Toward a Cybernetic Model of Man and
Society, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 387 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
''D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 7.
"'See Figure 7, at pp. 316-17 infra. The term "homeostasis" was coined by Walter Cannon, for
whom it signified "a condition-a condition which may vary, but which is relatively constant."
W. CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE BODY 24 (rev. ed. 1939). He rejected the term "equilibrium,"
explaining that:
The constant conditions which are maintained in the body might be termed equilibria.
That word, however, has come to have fairly exact meaning as applied to relatively
simple physico-chemical states, in closed systems, where known forces are balanced. The
coordinated physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states in the
organism are so complex and so peculiar to living beings - involving, as they may, the
brain and nerves, the heart, the lungs, kidneys and spleen, all working coopera-
tively-that I have suggested a special designation for these states, homeostasis. Id.
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the content variable and the structural variable. Content variable refers
to the substance, that is the manner of acquisition, magnitude and direc-
tion of information in the form of facts, norms, attitudes. In compari-
son, structural variable refers to the program or set of rules for dealing
with information.
The moderately low integration index level, as diagrammed in Figure
4 below, differs from the low integration index level
FIGURE 4:
$
Descriptive Model
for Moderately Low Integration Index
in that a structural variable is added which enables the system to gener-
ate alternate organizations of the constrained variety of information
inputs. It should be noted, however, that there is still no way to relate
the different content variables, other than by rough integrating rules
based on the conditionality of pre-established priorities. For example,
given situation X, then apply content variable C1; given situation Y,
then apply C2 . As Schroder, Driver and Streufert have pointed out,
"[t]his does not involve the simultaneous use of schemata by superordi-
nate rules other than conditional principles. In this sense, once a rule is
engaged, the moderately low integration index structure functions much
like the low integration index structure except that other schemata are
available.""..3 However, the alternate organizations do usher in the
11H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S. STREUFERT, supra note 98, at 18.
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problem of choice and probability. Examples of relatively complex ma-
chines that operate at this level are servo-mechanisms and thermostats,
as shown in Figure 7 (pages 316-17 below).
The next level of complexity is that of the moderately high integration
index. As shown diagrammatically by Figure 5 below, this level permits
comparison, combination, and other manipulations of the content varia-
ble organizations, according to the programmed rules represented by C I
C ', and C 3 in system S. The system at this level is self reflexive in
that various thought patterns can be used to reach the same decision.
Moreover, by use of this level of integrative system, the decision maker
can simultaneously take several points of view and can observe the
effects of its behavior and weigh the effects of taking different views.
At this level of complexity, the internal processes take on a more signifi-
cant role and the system itself becomes more autonomous and less
predictable with the increase in degrees of freedom and choice.
FIGURE 5: Descriptive Model
for Moderately High Integration Index
S
At this moderately high level of integrative index the rational-
deductive evaluative approach to policy determination, which is charac-
terized by its comparative coherence, is appropriate. This approach
aspires to construct a set of principles sufficient to generate an answer
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to each evaluative problem, and its strategy has been described as fol-
lows:
Let ultimate values be expressed in general principles satisfactory to
everybody who is ready to attend to the arguments identifying
them-or, if there is no hope of that, satisfactory at least to those who
are now undertaking a specific job of evaluation. Let these principles,
which may embody notions of happiness, welfare, justice, or intuitive
notions of goodness, be stated so exactly that they may be arranged
intelligibly in an order of priority that indicates precisely which princi-
ples govern the application of others and when. Then derive within the
limits of such a system intermediate principles that are suitable for
application in particular cases, and that-allowing for rare cases of
equality in net benefits-will indicate unambiguously which of alterna-
tive policies is to be chosen, according to the values they would pro-
mote."4
One of the inherent limitations of processing information on a moder-
ately high integration index level, is that the rational-deductive evalua-
tive method does not allow for structural change." 5 An example of this
method of integration would be a simulation programmed computer
which does not allow for end goal readjustment, and the analytical
model is that of the "first" cybernetics."'
Finally, the high integration index level is identified by its increased
interdependence, differentiation, selective openness and degrees of free-
dom. A further integrative step emerges at this complexity level, repre-
sented by C j, Cj, Ci, and Cjin Figure 6 below, for generating complex
conceptual relationships and thus altering structural variables. Here we
have what Professor Karl Deutsch of Harvard University has termed
goal-changing feedback -readjustments of the internal structural varia-
bles which implied the system's original goal, so that the system as a
whole will change its goal, "or set itself new goals which it will now have
to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened."" 7
'ID. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 61, at 9.
"'However, structural change could be effected at this level by an ad hoc or an irrational decision
to make such a change. There is obviously an inherent risk of error when making such a decision
with such a limited integration index. See Figure 7, on pp. 316-17 infra.
"
8 Magoroh Maruyama has distinguished a "first" cybernetics concerned with morphostasis
(deviation-counteracting mutual causal relationships) from the "second" cybernetics which is con-
cerned in addition with morphogenesis (deviation-amplifying mutual causal relationships). Maruy-
ama, Morphogenesis and Morphostasis, 48 METHODOS 12 (1960). See also Easton, A Systems
Analysis of Political Life, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 428
(W. Buckley ed. 1968).
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FIGURE 6:
S
Descriptive Model
for High Integration Index
The analytical model which describes transactions or policy evalua-
tions at this high level of complexity is the general systems or morphoge-
netic model."" As discussed above, the disjointed incrementalistic strat-
egy, with its ability to direct policy toward specific ills (remedial), pro-
vide for segmented and long-term change (serial), and adjust its end-
goals to reflect new experiences (exploratory), is the most appropriate
strategy for policy determination at the high integrative index level." 9
Man's cognitive system can operate at all levels of the complexity
"'Deutsch, Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social Sciences,
7 SYNTHESE 506, 515 (1948-49). For a discussion of the concept of feedback and some implications
of goal-changing feedback, see K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITI-
CAL COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL 182-99 (rev. ed. 1966); K. Deutsch, Communication Models
and Decision Systems, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 273-99 (J. Charlesworth ed. 1967);
D. EASTON, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 363-429 (1965).
"'For the distinction between morphostasis and morphogenesis, or "first" cybernetics and "sec-
ond" cybernetics, see note 116 supra.
"'The disjointed incrementalistic strategy is discussed in text accompanying notes 61-89 supra.
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continuum, as shown in Figure 7 below. 120 However, in attempting to
solve polycentric or multivariate problems, such as those which arise on
the international or transnational level and those which affect the future
of the entire human species, man has the affirmative obligation to use
the highest level of evaluative method in an attempt to reach optimal
decisions. It should be stressed that each level of complexity necessarily
subsumes each less complex level. For example, from the point of view
of "order" magnitude or negentropy the high integration index level is
made up of several moderately high index levels and still more of the
lower index levels. However, in the Gestalt sense, the high integration
index level is "greater" than the sum of its lower level index parts.
As discussed above,' it can be suggested that on the man qua
international society level, a trans-cultural consensus can be effectively
employed as the operational methodology for the incrementalistic strat-
egy. Note, however, that this consensus is not existential. Its utility lies
in that it is merely a point of departure: the consensus itself may struc-
turally change during the decision making process as a result of end-
goal feedback and internal changes in the content variables. It might be
argued that the evaluative approach or the evaluative structure along
with the information inputs teleologically determine the end-goal feed-
back and therefore the ultimate decision which will be made. The high
integrative index evaluative method would then be subject to the deter-
ministic criticism of the lower integrative levels. This contention raises
the perplexing problem of an infinite regress that confronts all deductive
conceptual analyses that aspire to complete comprehensiveness. 22 Such
an attack can be rebutted partially by the fact that the information
inputs are admittedly imperfect and varied and for this very reason the
adaptive system when operating on the high integrative index level is
relatively open. The criticism that it is impossible to determine the
essentially nonpredictive deviations then becomes irrelevant.
Simulation programmed computers may have the capacity, given
sophisticated programming, to behave or react at the highest integrative
index level.2 3 Several years ago an electronic machine was invented by
British engineers which simulates human learning processes: It was
"'Figure 7 is modification of Figure I ("Information Processing") in J. HILDEBRAND, SOVIET
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR FOR OPTIMAL DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS 122-23 (1969).
'See discussion in text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
.
2See E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF 6 (1960).
""'See G. EVANS, G. WALLACE & G. SUTHERLAND, SIMULATION USING DIGITAL COMPUTERS
(1967); Mowrer, Ego Psychology, Cybernetics, and Learning Theory, in LEARNING THEORY AND
CLINICAL RESEARCH 81 (The Kentucky Symposium 1954).
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FIGURE 7: Tentative Typology for Complexity Analysis*
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hoped that the machine would learn to exercise foresight after being
subjected to figurative rewards, inhibitions and punishments." 4 The
computer is capable of learning, and it can even be programmed to
simulate human emotions and feelings. 2' Norbert Weiner has warned
us that "in the social use of these new learning devices we are in a very
dangerous situation . . . . [The situation is] akin to the problem of
slavery. . . . We want two things of our machines, as we did of our
slaves: subservience and intelligence. There is a sort of dualism, not
unlike the quantum dualism, between the two; the more we get of one,
the less we get of the other."' 26
On a more optimistic level, it should be noted that eventually it may
be possible for simulation programmed computers to transcend those
structural variable constraints which are inherent in man's symbol sys-
tems. To a certain degree man's "time-binding" characteristic limits his
decision making to an ongoing and theoretically irreversible process. A
computer with no phylogenetic memory or cultural heritage might be
able to construct new structural variables without being affected by
man's "time-binding" constraints. Such new structural variables might
allow for alternate options which would not otherwise be readily per-
ceived by man whose eyes are often clouded by his own social matrix.
However, it should be cautioned that computers and advanced learn-
ing machines will not provide the easy answers for man as he attempts
to surmount the foreboding crises which are confronting him. Realisti-
cally, it might be further questioned whether as a civilization we could
overcome our suicidal tendencies and follow an optimal species-saving
policy if it were presented to us. As stated earlier in this article, the
choice today is "between technological advance that proceeds without
adequate consideration of its consequences and technological change
that is influenced by a deeper concern for the interaction between man's
tools and the human environment in which they do their work."' 127
' 
2 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1967, at 56, col. I (computer being "raised" like a child); MacKay,
supra note 107 at 40 (outline for programming self-organizing computer system capable of growing
in complexity "at a rate comparable with that of the learning process in human infancy").
"''See generally M. APTER, THE COMPUTER SIMULATION OF BEHAVIOR (1970); COMPUTER SIMU-
LATION OF PERSONALITY (S. Tomkins & S. Messick eds. 1963); J. LOEHLIN, COMPUTER MODELS
OF PERSONALITY (1968); Note, Computer Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Survey
with a View Toward Legal Applications, 24 STAN. L. REV. 712 (1972).
'I'M. Wiener, The Mathematics of Self-Organizing Systems, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INFORMATION AND DECISION PROCESSES 1, 16 (R. Machol & P. Gray eds. 1962). See generally
M. WIENER, THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS: CY1ERNETICS AND SOCIETY (1950).
' 
2 7
ee discussion accompanying note 58 supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Man's accretive socio-cultural ("time-binding") processes allow him
to control not only his present condition but also his personal destiny
and the destiny of his species. Most human institutions, including our
legal institutions, were created and exist to fulfill the neurophysiological
need of the human brain for certainty and meaning, for orientation in
time and space, and for subjecting man's perceived reality and environ-
ment to orderly explanation. The functional value of this cognitive be-
havior cannot be disputed, but as one commentator has warned:
It is this characteristic of human mind which makes the probability of
thermonuclear war so great. Only the most radical break with tradition
and the past, only by the most intense, sustained human efforts to
create a new human institution, to produce a human synthesis based
on the concepts of organic evolution and the objective analysis of
human history and social evolution, only by these heroic and demand-
ing efforts to unite all men, women and children across national, ideo-
logical, religious, racial, and economic barriers and conflicts can the
disastrous World War III be prevented. 2 1
The need for greater understanding and respect among all peoples of
the world is becoming increasingly apparent. But do we care enough to
educate ourselves, our students, and the general public in this manner?
The ability of any individual human brain to relate to another person
is influenced by the input of years of experiences indelibly inscribed in
millions of complex reverberating neuron circuits, and the problems of
world brotherhood and peace are directly related to solution of the
problem of the education and family training of children in the broad-
est, most realistic and truthful world view. Whether an American child
can relate himself to a Chinese or Russian child as a fellow human
being to work with or as an "enemy" to be hated, feared, and de-
stroyed depends upon the authorities who define values for the child,
the authorities who condition him. . . . Whether a capitalist's child
can relate to a Communist's child as a fellow human being or as
belonging to the "bad people" involves the same neurophysiological
mechanisms. 2 9
World stability and hopes for international peace hinge directly on
man's constructive use of his responsive rationality and his "time-
binding" ability. A trans-cultural consensus is beginning to permeate
'
2 Brewer, Political Effects of the Material Basis of Human Thought, 9 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIEN-
TIST, June 1966, at 9, 14.
mind.
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the area of international legal relations, and a qualified optimistic asser-
tion can be made that we will realize the necessity of applying this
accretive "time-binding" ability by using the means of education and
learning to lift our minds to a mankind perspective.
Similarly, the ineffectiveness of present solutions to prevent the dete-
rioration of the quality of our habitat indicates the need for reevaluating
both the methods used and the goals desired in environmental law not
only on the national but also on the global scale. Ideally, future environ-
mental programs must be synoptic in their approach. No small facet of
our complex cultural and technological system can be overlooked with-
out incurring the hazards of latent dysfunctionality, the long-term dis-
ruptive and unwanted consequences of policies which attempt to solve
polycentric problems and which otherwise, at least in the short term,
appear to be functionally viable solutions to immediate socio-economic
problems. Today many of the central ecological issues are essentially
"legal" in nature, but the success of any legal policy for environmental
control must ultimately be evaluated in terms of its long range effects.
If they are to assist in the formulation of these evaluations lawyers and
legal scholars must cooperate with social and natural scientists and
humanists, and participate in the development of new methods for stud-
ying interacting processes in complex systems. Only recently have law-
yers and legal scholars begun to take into account the interactions of
populations, environment, technology and social organizations. 3
The types of solutions necessary to avoid the impending environmen-
tal crisis will obviously place great strains upon basic political and
economic axioms. Such concepts as zero population growth 13' and no-
growth economy 132 require a shift in values away from quantitative and
13*See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest in
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE
L.J. 1069 (1970); Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 1153 (1970).
"'A population rate growth of zero occurs when the number of births equals the number of
deaths. Obviously, any program to reach this end would clash with the "right to propagate."
Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926).
Professor Kingsley Davis, director of international population and urban research at the University
of California and an advocate of the zero population growth concept, has stated that such a drastic
reduction in births would necessarily require not only a change in existing laws but also absolute
government regulation of the size of families-a concept that most nations have found impossible
to accept. "In a more Orwellian guise," writes Davis, "such control might include pressure through
limits on availability of housing, manipulation of inflation to force mothers to work, increased city
congestion by the deliberate neglect of transit systems, and increased personal insecurity through
rigged unemployment," TIME, Nov. 24, 1967, at 70. See Davis, Population Policy: Will Current
Programs Succeed?, 158 SCIENCE 730 (1967).
1
"
3 The concept of a "no-growth economy" was discussed extensively at a recent meeting of the
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toward qualitative criteria. "Not unending growth but ultimate thermo-
dynamic equilibrium would seem to be the only possible goal of a
human society that is committed to the preservation of the planet and
a sane future for its own posterity.""13 The most fundamental ques-
tions concerning our environmental crisis appear to be ethical ones: Will
a national policy of negative population growth or of negative economic
growth enhance justice for all human beings as members of society?
"These two ethical ideals of individual freedom and distributive justice
often are, or seem to be, more or less incompatible. The task of law-
givers throughout history, however, has been to strike a workable bal-
ance between them."' 4 So it must be as we prepare to meet our global
problems.
Environmental destruction has always been an aesthetic problem, but
today it also involves the survival of mankind as a species. Our civiliza-
tion can be viewed as moving from an era of "half technology," during
which rapid technological changes and industrialization took preced-
ence over de-humanizing and befouling effects on man's sociological
and ecological environment, to an era of "full technology" in which all
environmental effects of technological advancement will be considered
as indicators of the success of such advancement. During this period of
systemic change the socio-legal system will have to assume a greater
homeostatic function by equilibrating dysfunctional fluctuations caused
by such change. Our ability to meet our environmental crisis may be a
test of our intelligence and ultimately a test of the survival of our
species.
Human interaction produces stress and conflict within every society
and across national boundaries. 135 There is an increasing awareness that
United States Commission for UNESCO held in San Francisco, California, on November 24-28,
1969. Basically, the concept means the repudiation of the tenet of bigness and perpetual economic
expansion for the more optimal and qualitative concern for the ultimate consumer and the environ-
ment in general. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1969, at 26, cols. 2-5; id., Jan. 11, 1970, § 12, at 22,
col. I; id., Apr. 12, 1970, § 1, at 40, cols. 3-4.
""Hertz, The Technological Imperative-Social Implications of Professional Technology, 389
ANNALS 95, 106 (1970).
"'Revelle, supra note 6, at col. 6.
'11Concerning the reciprocal nature of social control within a legal system and the relatively
positive attributes of some forms of social deviance, see H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); R. BELL, SOCIAL DEVIANCE (1971); L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS
OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956); D. MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT (1959); Salem & Bowers, Severity
of Formal Sanctions as a Deterrent to Deviant Behavior. 5 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 21 (1970). See
also MAN CONTROLLED: READINGS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL (M. Karlins &
L. Andrews eds. 1971); E. WOLFENSTEIN, VIOLENCE OF NONVIOLENCE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC Ex-
PLORATION OF THE CHOICE OF POLITICAL MEANS IN SOCIAL CHANGE (1965).
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to at least a certain extent inter-human behavior is an area which is
preempted from legislative control by innate biological, psychological
and environmental determinants. The function of law and the legal
system in this area should not be to proscribe certain behavior, but
rather to constructively prescribe the societal framework which will
encourage progressive and consensual interactional behavior patterns.
There is a great need for law and the legal system to ease the pain of
social change and aid in the creation of a socio-economic environment
consistent with a continued qualitative human existence.' 31
As our world becomes more like a spaceship earth and as decisions
on the man qua international society level increasingly continue to affect
the future of mankind as an existing species, the need for a decision
making process with a high level integration index becomes more com-
pelling. The disjointed incrementalistic decision making strategy cou-
pled with a trans-cultural consensus may be the necessary operational
approach for determining the solutions to the dilemmas which have been
created by a world of polarized ideologies and for attempting to solve
the developing crises which threaten the continuing existence of the
human species. The great social effects of legal change have become too
obvious to be ignored. The question is no longer whether law is a signifi-
cant vehicle of social change, but rather how it functions as such, what
are the special problems that arise, and how can society plan for optimal
systemic legal change? In a sense, laws and legal change constitute an
important social reality. To quote a recent treatise on interactional
sociology: "Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a
hard immutable thing but is fragile and adjudicated-a thing to be
debated, compromised, and legislated."' 37 On the international and
transnational level, legal and para-legal institutions must necessarily
play an uncompromising role in insuring the stability and homeostatic
level of our human civilization.
The Bell is tolling. The time for a mankind perspective is now. We
have the technology and ability to control the quality and destiny of our
world environment, but unless we begin programming our social, politi-
cal, and economic relations to include all mankind, most assuredly, the
day after tomorrow will not belong to us.
'
38See, e.g., Gibbons, Law in an Age of Social Change, 57 A.B.A.J. 151 (1971).
"'G. MCCALL & J. SIMMONS, IDENTITIES AND INTERACTIONS 42 (1966).
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